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Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History 
 
…the extremely dubious speculative juggling, 
with the concepts and terms of the materialist 
method, which has under the pens of some of our 
Marxists transplanted the methods of formalism 
into the domain of the materialist dialectic; 
which has led to reducing the task to rendering 
defi nitions and classifi cations more precise and 
to splitting empty abstractions into four equally 
empty parts; in short, has adulterated Marxism 
by means of the indecently elegant mannerisms 
of Kantian epigones. It is a silly thing indeed 
endlessly to sharpen or resharpen an instrument, 
to chip away Marxist steel when the task 
is to apply the instrument in working over the 
raw material! (Leon Trotsky) 
 
2.1. The retreat into historical formalism 
In his polemic with Dühring, Engels described the theory of surplus-value and 
the materialistic conception of history as the ‘two great discoveries’ 
of Marx, through which were established the scientific foundations of socialism.  
Modern materialism, wrote Engels, characterised history as a ‘process of evolution’ 
and set itself the task of discovering its ‘laws of motion’.1 In one of the best 
reviews of Capital to appear at that time, a bourgeois economist Kaufmann 
repeated the point to Marx’s approval: Marx treats the social movement ‘as a 
process of natural history governed by laws’.2 In a famous resumé of his conception 
of history, written closer to our time, Braudel describes Marx as the 
originator of ‘historical models’.3 In their own way, these writers implied, in a 
language borrowed from the sciences of their time, that social phenomena like 
the phenomena of nature are scientifi cally penetrable, and that we owe the 
recognition of this fact to the work of Marx. Between the period from which 
this discovery dates and our own period, roughly in the last hundred years, 
the foundations of the older traditional conceptions of history collapsed as 
rapidly as the inherited conceptions of matter. But there the analogy ends. On 
the ruins of substantialism, a new physics evolved at rapid speed, whereas 
the ‘programme of a fully scientific history remains not merely to be realized, 
but even to be drafted’.4 In short, the materialist conception of history did not 
actually produce a specifically materialist history. 
 
In a sense, this abortion is not difficult to understand. Later in his life, 
Engels repeatedly noted in his correspondence5 that the younger elements 
attracted to Marxism saw in its theory, ‘historical materialism’, the summary 
of established results or points of arrival. In their conception, between historical 
materialism and materialist history there was a relation of immediate 
identity or implicit spontaneous derivation. Liberal-bourgeois historiography 
of that time and later proceeded as if theory could be derived from ‘facts’; in 
this positivist conception, ‘facts’ were objects outside theory, constituted, like 
matter, independently of consciousness. For vulgar Marxism, infected by the 
illusion which Engels noted, history, already endowed with its theory (‘historical 
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materialism’), consisted in the application of this theory to ‘facts’. By 
its vulgar conception of historical materialism this tendency implicitly threat- 
ened to submerge the scientific possibilities contained in Marx’s conception 
of history in a quasi-positivism for which theory was latent in an objective 
succession of immutable facts. If such a premise were accepted, only minor 
differences remained: for positivism, the collection of those facts would lead 
spontaneously to the framing of general ‘laws’; for the vulgar tendencies in 
Marxism these ‘laws’ were already known, and the task of history lay in their 
verification by ‘facts’.6 
 
In fact, as we know,7 it was this convergence which became central to the 
Marxism of that period. For Marx himself, the task of scientific history consisted 
in the determination of the laws regulating the movement of different 
epochs of history, their ‘laws of motion’ as they were called after the example 
of the natural sciences. Vulgar Marxism abdicated this task for a less ambitious 
programme of verifying ‘laws’ already implicit, as it supposed, in the materialist 
conception of history. Whereas Marx had noted, as one of the points ‘not 
to be forgotten’, that is, to be investigated in future by him or others, the ‘dialectic 
of the concepts productive force and relation of production, a dialectic 
whose boundaries are to be determined’,8 a whole tradition from Plekhanov 
to Stalin argued with more assurance. Reverting to a naturalistic conception 
of history that Engels himself had explicitly rejected in the Dialectics of Nature 
(see the note on ‘causality’), Plekhanov wrote: ‘We now know that the development 
of the productive forces, which in the final analysis determines the 
development of all social relations, is determined by the properties of the 
geographical environment’.9 Reared in a Plekhanovist tradition, as so many 
of the other Bolsheviks were, but with a singular capacity for vulgarisation, 
Stalin would tell the party-cadre many years later, ‘first the productive forces 
of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in 
conformity with them, men’s relations of production, their economic relations 
change’. Marx had been emphatic that abstract laws do not exist in history, 
that the laws of motion which operate in history are historically determinate 
laws. He indicated thereby that the scientific conception of history could be 
concretised only through the process of establishing these laws, specific to 
each epoch, and their corresponding categories. In other terms, through a process 
of producing concepts on the same level of historical ‘concreteness’ as 
the concepts of ‘value’, ‘capital’ and ‘commodity-fetishism’. The ‘laws’ which 
Plekhanov and Stalin proposed were laws of the historical process in general. 
 
The tradition of vulgar Marxism which drew its earliest sources of energy 
from the Marxism of the Second International, crystallised only under the 
domination of Stalin. Stalinism uprooted not only the proletarian orientations 
of Marxism, but its scientifi c foundations as well. For the dialectic as the 
principle of rigorous scientific investigation of historical processes – it was, 
after all, this rational dialectic that was ‘a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom 
and its doctrinaire professors’10 – Stalinism substituted the ‘dialectic’ 
as a cosmological principle prior to, and independent of, science. For the 
materialist conception of history, it substituted a theory of history ‘in general’, 
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‘converting historical epochs into a logical succession of inflexible social 
categories’.11 
Finally, this rubber-stamp conception of history it represented as a 
history déjà constituée, open therefore only to the procedures of verification. 
This lifeless bureaucratic conception, steeped in the methods of formalism, 
produced a history emptied of any specifi cally historical content, reduced by 
the forced march of simple formal abstractions to the meagre ration of a few 
volatile categories. Within five decades of Marx’s death, the history written 
by the Stalinists became as opaque and dream-like, and hardly as exciting, as 
the fantasies of Surrealism. 
 
Superficially these conceptions seemed to conflict, to clash sharply: the 
cosmological 
dialectic asserted a principle of continuous flux in the vast ambit of the Universe; 
‘historical materialism’, by contrast, proposed a principle of eternal recurrence, of the 
endless repetition of essentially identical mechanisms. Yet beneath this apparent 
conflict, idealism provided the deeper connection between these conceptions, in the 
idea, found both in the Academy’s conception of history12 and, much later, in 
abstract, systematising rationalism,13 that reason abolishes the chaotic flux of the 
empirical order when it grasps those abstract principles of necessity which are its 
deeper rational foundations. The 
Academy sought these principles in the geometric layout of the heavens and 
in the mathematical forms associated with the different material elements. At 
a certain stage in its evolution, Greek thought deprived history of any intrinsic 
signifi cance. ‘It became interested only to the extent that history offered 
clues to the nature of the enduring realities’.14 To its cosmological conception 
of the dialectic Stalinism thus welded a cosmological conception of history, 
the ancestry of which lay not in Marx but in the whole tradition of metaphysics 
beginning with the Academy. 
 
In their Stalinist determination, the basic categories of the materialist conception 
functioned as abstractions akin to Platonic Ideas.15 The full impact of 
this paradox is driven home when we compare this formalist construction of 
history, entirely metaphysical in character, to the real, if limited, progress of 
the politically domesticated currents of ‘academic’ history. The pioneers who 
explored, colonised and subjugated the ‘continent’ of history discovered by 
Marx were not Marxists, by and large: Rostovtzeff, Mickwitz, Ostrogorsky, 
Pirenne, Kato Shigeshi, Hamilton, Goitein.16 Moreover, the ‘most successful 
revolutionary group of modern historians’17 around Annales bore only a marginal 
and indirect relation to Marxism. On this current, Marxism exerted its 
infl uence only at a distance, through the sociology of Weber and the writings 
of Sombart and Henri Sée.18 In fact, the reverse was true: the few consciously 
Marxist historians who grew up in this period were largely formed, to one 
degree or another, in connection with Annales: notably, Labrousse, Lefebvre, 
Vilar, Pach, Kula.19 This strictly professional history, not known for purely 
scholastic disquisitions on ‘modes of production’ and ‘social formations’, 
came far closer to the conceptions of Marx than the whole tradition of abstract 
historical formalism which passed for ‘Marxism’ and which, in the period of 
its confident domination, decisively shaped all later discussions of the ‘mode 
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of production’. 
2.2. Produktionsweise as ‘labour-process’ and ‘epoch of production’ 
A summary glance at the Grundrisse or Capital would show that Marx 
ascribed two distinct meanings to Produktionsweise [mode of production]. 
According to one of these, it was indistinguishable from the ‘labour-process 
[Arbeitsprozess]’, or what Lenin would sometimes call the ‘technical process 
of production’. For example, in a brief reference to the domestic system, 
Marx writes: 
The manufacturer in the French silk industry and in the English hosiery and 
lace industries was mostly but nominally a manufacturer until the middle 
of the nineteenth century. In point of fact, he was merely a merchant, who 
let the weavers carry on in their old unorganised way and exerted only a 
merchant’s control, for that was for whom they really worked. This system 
presents everywhere an obstacle to the real capitalist mode of production 
and goes under with its development. Without revolutionising the mode 
of production, it only worsens the condition of the direct producers, turns 
them into mere wage-workers and proletarians under conditions worse 
than those under the immediate control of capital, and appropriates their 
surplus-labour on the basis of the old mode of production.20 
When capital concentrates these scattered producers into one manufactory, it 
‘no longer leaves them in the mode of production found already in existence, 
establishing its power on that basis, but rather creates a mode of production 
corresponding to itself, as its basis. It posits the concentration of the workers 
in production…’.21 When Lenin describes this process of the subordination of 
the simple-commodity producer by capital, his vocabulary is more precise: 
‘The subordination begins with merchant’s and usury capital, then grows into 
industrial capitalism, which in its turn is at first technically quite primitive, 
and does not differ in any way from the old systems of production – which is 
still based on hand labour and on the dominant handicraft industries…’.22 
For Lenin, this incipient ‘industrial capitalism’ which evolves out of the 
merchant’s domination over the small producer is quite compatible with 
the ‘system of production’ inherited from small-scale handicraft industries. 
In this form of incipient capitalism, capital operates on an inherited labour process. 
When he describes this phenomenon, Marx writes: ‘Here then the 
mode of production is not yet determined by capital, but rather found on hand 
by it’;23 whereas Lenin prefers to say, ‘Capital always takes the technical process 
of production as it finds it, and only subsequently subjects it to technical 
transformation’.24 Again, in the sections dealing with relative surplus-value in 
Capital, Volume I, we find Marx writing: ‘With regard to the mode of production 
itself, manufacture, in its strict meaning, is hardly to be distinguished, 
in its earliest stages, from the handicraft trades of the guilds, otherwise than 
by the greater number of workmen simultaneously employed by one and 
the same individual capital’.25 
When surplus-value has to be produced by the conversion of necessary 
labour into surplus-labour, it by no means suffi ces for capital to take over 
the labour-process in the form under which it has been historically handed 
down…The technical and social conditions of the process, and consequently 
the very mode of production must be revolutionised before the productiveness 
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of labour can be increased.26 
Elsewhere in these sections, he writes that an increase in the productivity of 
labour posits as its condition a revolution in the ‘mode of production and the 
labour-process itself’. When he says in the Grundrisse that ‘agriculture forms 
a mode of production sui generis…’,27 he means that it is defined by technical 
conditions peculiar to itself. 
 
In various other passages where Marx made more general statements about 
the various stages of social development, Produktionsweise fi gured in a broader 
and more specifically historical meaning. Modes of production are variously 
called: ‘forms of production’;28 ‘forms of the social process of production’; 
‘epochs in the economic development of society’;29 ‘epochs of production’;30 
‘periods of production’31 or, finally, ‘historical organizations of production’.32 
Here, the ‘mode of production’ figures as a ‘social form of production’ or 
‘social form of the production process’.33 
2.3. Levels of abstraction in historical materialism 
2.3.1. Wage-labour as abstract determination and determinate abstraction 
All the various tendencies of that abstract scholastic formalism which dominated 
Marxist theory much later accepted the implicit premise that a scientific 
history could be derived spontaneously from the materialist conception. In 
other words, the unity of these various currents lay essentially in a Ricardian 
methodology of ‘forced abstractions’.34 
 
The definition of the different epochs of production distinguished by Marx 
required only a closer examination of their specific ‘relations of production’, 
which were nothing else than the various forms which the subjugation of 
labour assumed historically. ‘Our definition will characterize feudalism primarily 
as a “mode of production”’, wrote Dobb in his major work of historical 
interpretation. ‘As such it will be virtually identical with what we generally 
mean by serfdom…’.35 As he would explain later in his debate with Sweezy, 
by ‘serfdom’ was meant ‘exploitation of the producer by virtue of direct polit- 
ico-legal compulsion’, or ‘coercive extraction of surplus labour’.36 According 
to this formal abstractionism, modes of production were deducible, by a relation 
of ‘virtual identity’, from the given forms of exploitation of labour. These 
forms of exploitation, the so-called ‘relations of production’, were the independent 
variables of the materialist conception of history. 
 
This conception, quite unexceptionable as it appears, became one of the 
most widespread and persistent illusions of vulgar Marxism. Although neither 
Marx nor Engels ever consciously refl ected on the nature of their categories 
– the fact that Marx distinguished implicitly between ‘simply formal 
abstractions’ and ‘true abstractions’, that he saw in his failure to carry abstraction 
‘far enough’ the secret of Ricardo’s confusions on ‘value’, that he himself 
subjected ‘wage-labour’ to a careful and painstaking analysis – all go to indicate 
that, in the materialist conception, the process of investigating and defining 
the ‘relations of production’ in any given epoch was far more complicated 
that Dobb seemed to imagine. 
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To begin with ‘wage-labour’: in the dominant inherited notion, a wage-labourer 
is one who, divorced from any means of subsistence, is forced to 
sell her labour-power to others. ‘Wage-labour’, in this vulgar definition, is 
dispossessed labour, labour divorced from the means of production, with 
labour-power as a commodity. When Dobb defined capitalism on a model 
symmetrical to his definition of feudalism, he called it ‘a system under which 
labour-power has itself become a commodity, bought and sold on the market 
like any other object of exchange’.37 In this definition of capitalist production, 
‘wage-labour’ figures as the commodity labour-power, that is, as a simple 
category. 
 
Marx defined ‘simple categories’ as those which were common to several 
epochs of production. In this simple determination, ‘wage-labour’, that is, 
the commodity labour-power, was known under various forms of social production 
before the capitalist epoch. Duby tells us that ‘from the very earliest 
years of the thirteenth century, the administrators of the estates of the bishop 
of Winchester spent hundreds of pounds every year on wages’. Moreover, 
‘on the lands of Worcester Abbey the growth of the demesne economy was 
entirely achieved by taking on wage labor…The accounts of Henry de Bray, 
a knight of no great wealth, show that men subject to labour service played 
hardly any part in the cultivation of the demesne, which was wholly worked 
by hired labour’.38 
 
In accordance with the requirements of capitalist production, ‘wage-labour’, 
in this simple determination as the commodity labour-power, was the necessary 
basis of capitalism as the generalised form of social production. Within 
certain limits, the mobility of labour-power became as essential to the laws 
of motion of capital as the ability of capital itself to operate on a world-scale. 
But the historical specifi city of wage-labour, its character as a specifi cally 
bourgeois relation of production, its position as a historically determinate 
abstraction equivalent to the abstractions ‘capital’ and ‘commodity-fetishism’ 
– derived from quite other mechanisms than this mere generalisation of the 
labour-power commodity. At this deeper level of abstraction, where it now fi gured, 
in the process of Marx’s analysis, as a ‘concrete’ category,39 wage-labour 
was, for Marx, capital-positing, capital-creating labour. ‘Wage labour, here, 
in the strict economic sense,’ Marx wrote, ‘is capital-positing, capital-producing 
labour’.40 In a methodology of forced abstractions, which identified relations 
of production with particular forms of exploitation, the concept of ‘historical 
specificity’ was radically impoverished. Sweezy, for example, found Dobb’s 
position unacceptable; he argued that there was nothing specifi cally feudal in 
the ‘exploitation of producers by virtue of direct politico-legal compulsion’.41 
To this, Dobb replied that the elements of such compulsion do occur in a 
subordinate 
and incidental role in various other forms of economy: ‘if [these elements] 
are merely incidental and subordinate, their presence no more suffices 
to constitute [the form of economy in question] as feudal than does the incidental 
existence of hired wage-labour suffi ce to constitute a particular society 
capitalist’.42 In other terms, if we follow out the logic of this argument, what 
makes an economy ‘capitalist’ is the statistical preponderance of the simple 
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abstraction ‘labour-power as a commodity’. A simple category becomes a 
historically 
determinate category when it becomes historically preponderant. 
 
This failure to understand ‘wage-labour’ at the same level of abstraction 
as Marx, in the ‘strict economic sense’ which Marx gave it, that is, as abstract, 
value-producing labour, hence as labour which already posits the elements of 
capitalist production, would lead Dobb to quite absurd positions. He would 
be compelled to argue, for example, that when some of the most deeply 
entrenched feudal estates of thirteenth-century England often based their 
production mainly or entirely on paid labour (‘wage-labour’ in Dobb’s sense), 
specifically capitalist relations of production were established.43 He would 
have to hold that the Russian feudal estates which utilised slave-labour in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries44 operated within the framework of a 
‘slave mode of production’. He would have to hold that wherever in history 
the extraction of surplus-labour was based on ‘coercion’, feudal relations of 
production predominated, or ‘coexisted’ according to the currently fashionable 
conceptions. 
2.3.2. Serf-owning capital 
In fact, Dobb himself might have found several clear indications in the 
revolutionary- 
Marxist tradition refuting his law of the ‘virtual identity’ of forms 
of exploitation and relations of production. Analysing the pottery industry 
of Moscow gubernia, characterised by the Narodniks as a ‘purely domestic’ 
industry, Lenin wrote: 
The relations in this industry are bourgeois…We see how a minority, 
owning larger and more profi table establishments, accumulate ‘savings’, 
while the majority are ruined…It is obvious and inevitable that the latter 
should be enslaved to the former – inevitable precisely because of the 
capitalist character of the given production relations…Do not think that this 
exploitation, this oppression is any less marked because relations of this kind 
are still poorly developed, because the accumulation of capital, 
accompanying 
the ruination of the producers, is negligible. Quite the contrary. This only 
leads to cruder, serf forms of exploitation, to a situation where capital, not yet 
able to subjugate the worker directly, by the mere purchase of his 
labourpower 
at its value, enmeshes him in a veritable net of usurious extortion, 
binds him to itself by kulak methods, and as a result robs him not only of 
the surplus-value, but of an enormous part of his wages too…45 
In this industry, then, specifically capitalist relations of production were 
expressed and mediated through ‘serf forms of exploitation’. Against Struve, 
Lenin wrote elsewhere: 
The argument is based on extremely strange methods that are not Marxist 
at all. A comparison is made between ‘bondage’ and ‘differentiation’ as 
between two independent special ‘systems’…This bondage which he has 
now demolished as retrogressive is nothing but the initial manifestation of 
capitalism in agriculture…It is purely capitalist in essence, and the entire 
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peculiarity consists in the fact that this initial, embryonic form of capitalist 
relations is totally enmeshed in the feudal relations of former times: here 
there is no free contract, but a forced deal…46 
In these passages, Lenin argued, in other words, that as simple-commodity 
producers are subordinated to the power of capital, in town or village, and 
specifically bourgeois relations of production develop, far from transforming 
bondage and serf-forms of exploitation into specifically capitalist forms 
of exploitation, i.e., those forms which correspond to the ‘classical, adequate 
mode of production of capital’, these new relations of production, founded 
on capital, intensify the existing backward forms of exploitation: these forms 
remain ‘feudal’ or ‘semi-feudal’ in character, while the relations of production 
acquire a bourgeois character.47 Because Lenin understood this mechanism, 
he could refer elsewhere to ‘semi-feudal forms of appropriation of surplus value’,48  
just as Kautsky refers, in the Agrarfrage, to the fact that in the early 
growth of capitalism in European silviculture, ‘surplus-value’ was produced 
by exploiting a feudally-subjugated labour-force [travail forcé de nature féodale].49  
Earlier than either Lenin or Kautsky, Marx himself spoke of the production 
of ‘surplus-value’ in the cotton-plantations of the American South.50 
Although the translation of Moore and Aveling distorted the sense of this 
passage when it used ‘surplus-labour’ for Mehrwert, the meaning was abundantly 
clear to both Rosa Luxemburg and Preobrazhensky. Luxemburg, with 
this passage in mind, spoke of ‘capitalist accumulation with forms of slavery 
and serfdom’ persisting up until the 1860s in the American South, and, as late 
as her own day in Rumania, ‘and various overseas colonies’.51 In his own 
commentary, 
Preobrazhensky wrote, ‘the important thing is that there are present 
all the prerequisites of surplus-value, except the last, which is characteristic 
of the development of capitalism – the transformation of labour-power into 
a commodity’; he proposed ‘transitional forms of surplus-value’ as a more 
precise characterisation.52 Again, in Capital Volume III, Marx referred to the 
evolution of merchant-capital in the ancient world transforming ‘a patriarchal 
slave-system devoted to the production of immediate means of subsistence 
into one devoted to the production of surplus-value’.53 According to an edict 
of 1721, Peter the Great had allowed the Russian factory-owners to utilise 
serf-labour. ‘But if the factory-owner could now carry on his business with 
the labour of serfs’, wrote Pokrovsky, ‘who prevented the serf-holder from 
establishing a factory?’ To Pokrovsky the edict was one of the forerunners 
of ‘bondage or landlord capitalism’.54 Analysing the land-question in Peru, 
Mariátegui wrote about the technically advanced capitalist latifundia on the 
coast, owned by US and British business, in which ‘exploitation still rests on 
feudal practices and principles’.55 In its Theses on the Eastern Question adopted 
at the Fourth Congress, the colonial commission of the Comintern spoke of 
capitalism arising in the colonies ‘on feudal foundations’ and developing ‘in 
distorted and incomplete transitional forms which give commercial capital 
predominance’.56 Finally, outside the Marxist tradition, Hobson could refer 
to industrial profits which ‘represented the surplus-value of slave or forced 
labour’,57 and Barrington Moore to ‘labor-repressive forms of capitalist agriculture’.58  
In all these varied instances – the subordination of the potters 
of Moscow province to merchant-capital, the production of cotton in the 
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slave South, the expansion of landlord-capitalism in Rumanian agriculture or 
Petrine industry, the sugar-latifundia of coastal Peru – there was no question 
of identifying the ‘mode of production’ according to the character of the given 
forms or relations of exploitation. Nor did any of these instances involve a 
‘coexistence’ of modes of production. 
2.3.3. The defining role of the laws of motion 
To identify the different kinds of motion is to identify the bodies 
themselves. 
(Engels to Marx 1873) 
Engels defined the dialectic as the ‘science of the general laws of motion of 
the external world’.59 But the abstractness of the dialectic in this defi nition 
deprived it of its specifically revolutionary function in Marx. For Marx, as his 
approval of Kaufman’s review indicates, the dialectic was, more specifi cally, a 
science of the laws of motion of the ‘social process’, profoundly historical by 
its very nature, not only in that it guided only the investigation of social (or 
historical) phenomena, but insofar as it denied that such phenomena could 
be understood according to abstract or historically indeterminate (social or 
historical) laws: ‘in Marx’s opinion’, Kaufman wrote, ‘every historical period 
has laws of its own’.60 The dialectic in Capital was thus nothing else than the 
rigorous, systematic investigation of the laws of motion of capitalist production, 
in the course of which a series of simple abstractions (‘wage-labour’, 
money, etc.) were historically concretised as bourgeois relations of production, 
or abstractions determinate to capitalism as a mode of production; that 
is, reconstituted as ‘concrete categories’, as historically determinate social 
forms. It follows that modes of production are impenetrable at the level of 
simple abstractions. The process of ‘true abstraction’ is simultaneously a process 
of ‘concretisation’, of the definition of specific historical laws of motion. 
Isolating the enterprise of production under capitalism, Marx analysed these 
laws at two levels: at the level of each enterprise (or ‘economic unit’: Lenin) 
and at the level of the social totality of enterprises. If we generalise from this 
analysis, at its first level, the enterprise, an isolated entity, figures as a unit 
of production governed by specific laws which impose on it a determinate 
mode of economic behaviour, converting the given inherited forms of the 
labour-process into the form posited by their own motion. It follows that 
the different types of enterprise which form the basic cell of production in a 
given social form of economy are determined, in the first instance, as units 
of production, and only crystallise (that is, acquire their classical developed 
structure) in the determinate form of historically specifi c modes of organisation 
of the labour-process which posit a particular level of technique and 
specific historical forms of the appropriation of the objective conditions of 
labour. At the level of the economy of enterprises, the process of investigation 
traces those tendencies which derive from the behaviour of each enterprise at 
the level of all enterprises. In Marx, Capital, Volume I comprises the analysis 
of the enterprise (of capitalist production) as an isolated entity, as individual 
capital – of the production and accumulation of surplus-value and of the 
labour-process as a value-producing process, which Marx characterises as 
the ‘direct process of the production of capital’ or the ‘immediate productive 
process’. The laws of the rising organic composition of capital and of 
 10 
the concentration and centralisation of capital are already implied in the 
motion of individual capital (of capital as an isolated enterprise). Volumes 
II and III derive the laws of motion of capital at higher levels of integration 
(social capital, many capitals) from the laws of motion of capital as an isolated 
entity, arriving fi nally at the transformation of surplus-value into profi t 
and the law of the falling rate of profi t. The fi rst three parts of Volume III 
complete the definition of capitalism as a mode of production. Taken as a 
whole, across its various stages, the substance of Marx’s analysis lies in its 
definition of the laws of motion of capitalist production: the production and 
accumulation of surplus-value, the revolutionisation of the labour-process, 
the production of relative surplus-value on the basis of a capitalisticallyconstituted 
labour-process, the compulsion to increase the productivity of 
labour, etc. The ‘relations of capitalist production’ are the relations which 
express and realise these laws of motion at different levels of the social 
process of production. They are, as Marx calls them in a polemic against 
Proudhon, ‘all the economic relations which are merely the necessary relations 
of the particular mode of production’. As modes of production are only 
a definite totality of historical laws of motion, relations of production thus 
become a function of the given mode of production. The character of any defi nite 
type of production relations, is, in short, impossible to determine until these 
laws of motion are themselves determined. 
 
Finally, apart from deriving the nature of production relations of a given 
type from the mode of production as such, the defi ning role of the laws of 
motion implies that the specifi c economic rhythms through which these laws 
become at once historically effective and verifi able are themselves purely 
derivative economic phenomena. Although phenomena of this order (trends, 
cycles, intercycles) are in some sense perceptible and open to statistical 
determination 
independently of any conception of those laws, of which they are 
simply the expression, their historical content remains indeterminate without 
a prior conceptualisation in economic theory.61 Lacking any determination in 
theory, they retain their character as empirical (quantitative) facts: on certain 
epistemological premises – observation as the origin of theory – they become 
therefore the basis for positing ‘laws’ of a purely fictitious nature, e.g., the 
‘acceleration principle’ of neoclassical economic theory. 
2.3.4. The failure of abstraction in vulgar Marxism 
Even when the later Marxism broke with Stalinism politically, its theoretical 
conceptions were to a large extent still imprisoned in the deeper framework 
of a metaphysical-scholastic formalism, which deduced its ‘modes of production’ 
by forced abstraction from the simple categories present in various 
epochs of production. The classification of ‘modes of production’ which came 
to prevail on this basis resembled nothing so much as the Periodic Table 
of Mendeleiev, when the discovery of the structure of the atom had yet to 
explain the physical basis of that Table. The simple abstractions of Stalinist 
history, its ‘inflexible social categories’, functioned in the historical process 
as social substances, and this Newtonian conception of history was absorbed 
into the later Marxism, even when it modifi ed or rejected the established 
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sequence of those elements. (In this sense, the ‘linear notion of historical 
time’ had always been a purely subsidiary characteristic of vulgar historical 
materialism.) In short, the naïve conception of ‘relations of production’ as 
forms of exploitation of labour, and the classification of ‘modes of production’ 
according to the simple formal identities which this equation yielded, 
remained essential links of continuity between the ossified pseudo-Marxism 
of the Stalinists and the ‘critical’ tendencies of modern Marxism. 
 
The persistent underlying confusion between ‘relations of production’ and 
therefore, in this conception, ‘modes of production’, with the different mechanisms 
of surplus-labour extraction became the most characteristic symptom 
of this continuity of problematics in the more recent debates on the ‘transition’ 
and on the nature of imperialist world-economy. Despite their critical 
character, these debates produced no breakthroughs by way of a specifi cally 
Marxist analysis either of the decline of feudalism or of colonial history. 
 
It was precisely in the backward countries subjugated to world-economy 
as colonies that the process of the mediation of capitalist (value-producing) relations 
of production by archaic (‘precapitalist’) forms of subjection of labour assumed 
historically unprecedented dimensions, while feudal relations of production figured 
predominantly in their pure form of commodity-feudalism. Insofar as these 
relationships were perceived by them, a number of Marxists conceptualised 
them, completely wrongly, as the structure of the ‘social formations’ themselves. 
The chaos of simple abstractions was overcome by them through the 
simple notion, today commonplace to the point of banality, that the colonial 
‘social formations’ typically ‘combined’ a number of ‘modes of production’ 
(which was true, of course, but not at this level of abstraction). 
 
The colonial countries were mainly dominated by two distinct forms of 
enterprise, radically different in their specifi c laws of motion and characteristic 
preoccupations, but converging in their external forms: on one side, in most 
of Latin America and parts of South-East Asia, feudal estates integrated into 
the network of world commodity-exchanges, estates which, in their external 
attributes, resembled capitalist enterprises insofar as the major share of their 
output was produced for national and international markets; on the other, 
in the West Indies, most of Africa and large sectors of Asia, capitalist fi rms 
operating mainly through archaic (‘precapitalist’) modes of labour-organisation 
at low and generally stagnant levels of technique. Isolated from their specifi 
c laws of motion, these enterprises disintegrate analytically into a single 
type, ‘capitalist’ or ‘precapitalist’ according to the specifi c formal appearances 
collapsing them together (for Frank, commodity-production; for Laclau, the 
prevalence of servitude of various forms).62 This collapsing together, from 
which followed the false conception of the colonial world as a ‘sector’, or unified  
totality of production-relations of one type, became one of the common 
premises in the debate started by the publication of Frank’s book. 
 
The whole challenge which the ‘colonial question’ poses for historical materialism 
lies in establishing these distinct economic rhythms and movements, 
in tracing their specific origins according to the conjuncture of world-economy, 
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and fi nally in grasping their deeper connections. If the feudal enterprises 
of the colonial world functioned as commodity-producers, the explanation 
lies basically not in their historical position as colonial enterprises (that is, 
not in their determinate form and function as elements in a specific type of 
social formation), but in their specifi cally feudal character; and, if the capitalist 
enterprises which dominated most of colonial Africa and large parts of 
Asia utilised coercive forms of exploitation, we must ask whether the laws of 
motion of capital are not, within certain limits, compatible with ‘barbarous 
forms of labour’. 
 
Thus, neither the phenomena of colonial history nor the disintegration of 
feudalism could be subjected to a specifi cally Marxist analysis as long as relations 
of production were conceived in their abstract, one-sided determination 
as ‘forms of exploitation’. For, on this premise, Marxists consciously or 
unconsciously 
denied the intrinsic connection between feudalism and commodityproduction, 
or between bondage and capitalism, which was established in 
given historical conditions. Once currency began to circulate on an expanding 
scale, the whole tendency of feudal production lay in the direction of its 
integration into circuits of commodity-exchange. Moreover, the whole history 
of colonialism in Africa was basically a history of capitalist enterprises subjugating 
peasant labour on specifi cally non-capitalist foundations. Both these 
phenomena, characterised by Marx as ‘intermediate, hybrid forms [Mittelgattungen, 
Zwittergattungen]’63 were historically never of purely limited scope or 
passing signifi cance. The ‘second serfdom’ engulfed most of Eastern Europe 
and large areas of Latin America, where it persisted for well over four centuries, 
longer than capitalism has existed in its classical form of large-scale 
socialised production; and the archaic barbarous forms of capitalist production 
itself appeared sporadically over a similar historical span – from the early 
origins of the ‘domestic system’ in medieval Europe, through the sugar plantations 
of Barbados in the seventeenth century, to the gold-mines of South 
Africa in the nineteenth, the agrarian colonate of Algeria, the Junker estates of 
Prussia, the tea plantations of Assam and sugar centrales of Cuba, or, fi nally, 
in our own century, the processing factories of coastal Peru, cotton fi elds of 
northern Mozambique or white settler-farms of Kenya.64 
 
Constricted by their problematic of characterisation (of simple formal 
abstraction), the debates among Marxists perceived these facts in a purely 
one-sided, distorted way: that is, the facts were ‘formulated’ incorrectly even 
when they were perceived. Sweezy perceived a certain connection between 
the decay of feudalism and expanding commodity-relationships, but formulated 
the connection as a collapse of feudal economy. Dobb, and later, 
in Dobb’s tradition, Laclau, perceived the link between commodity-production 
and the intensification of servitude, but concluded, from their famous 
‘virtual identity’, that the market ‘consolidated’ the feudal economy.65 Frank 
perceived the intrinsic bond which tied the feudal haciendas to the market, 
only to dissolve it immediately by defi ning them as ‘capitalist’.66 Bettelheim 
argued, correctly, that the exploitation of colonial peasants by capitalist fi rms 
had to be ‘rooted at the level of production’, only to reconstitute the relation at 
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the level of exchange in saying that these peasants sold not their labour-power 
but their products.67 The new currents of ‘political economy’ infl uenced by 
Arrighi and Amin correctly defined the role of the ‘labour-reserves’ in Africa 
in relation to the needs of capital accumulation, only to characterise them as 
distinct ‘modes of production’ perpetuated by capital.68 
 
Marx himself had proposed the view that ‘commerce has a more or less 
dissolving influence everywhere on the producing organization, which it 
finds at hand and whose different forms are mainly carried on with a view to 
use-value’.69 When the world-market crystallised after the revolution of the 
sixteenth century, these ‘producing organizations’ or enterprises, as we have 
called them, consisted mainly of two types: feudal estates and independent 
peasant family-labour farms. The progressive integration of these types of 
enterprise into commodity-circuits convulsed both, but only on the longer 
historical scale of several centuries. Both the feudal estates and the peasant 
farms entered a process of dissolution, but neither ‘collapsed’ or disappeared 
immediately. Moreover, this process of dissolution acquired, in the case of 
feudalism, a ‘combined’ character. Feudal production (the feudal mode of production) 
both crystallised and decayed within the framework of expanding market- 
relations: the feudal estate both acquired its ‘classical’, fully developed, 
structure and reached its inherent limits as a commodity-producing enter- 
prise. By contrast to both forms, the slave-plantations, normally regarded as 
‘precapitalist’, disintegrated by an entirely different process, not immediately 
connected with the expanding volume of exchanges in whose vortex they 
were, in fact, born as ‘centres of commercial speculation’. 
2.4. Reading history backwards 
When the revolutionary-Marxist tradition took up the analysis of the 
worldeconomy 
early in the present century, the context was set by an international 
division of labour centred on the requirements of capital-reproduction on the 
basis of large-scale industrial enterprises. The classical conception which now 
evolved in the writings of Lenin, Luxemburg and Bukharin saw in the major 
tendencies of evolution of the world economy the separate phases of the 
reproduction-process of capital: the conversion of value into money and of 
money, as the pure form of value, into capital. The debate which began closer 
to our own period about the early phases of evolution of the world-economy 
inherited this classical conception and converted its points of arrival into 
points of departure. If, to the Marxists of the Second and Third Internationals, 
the contemporary world-market was an entirely capitalist phenomenon, it 
seemed evident to Frank that the world-economy had been capitalist from its 
inception. So deeply entrenched was this notion, that, even when he disputed 
Frank’s position that capitalism prevailed in Peru or Chile from the earliest 
stages of the Spanish colonisation, Laclau accepted his premise that metropolitan- 
industrial capital provided the major impulse behind this process of 
colonisation. For Frank, colonisation converted the countries of Latin America 
into ‘sources for metropolitan capital accumulation and development’; for 
Laclau, too, the world-economy was, from its inception, an expression of the 
accumulation-process: ‘the growth of the system depends on the accumulation 
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of capital, the rhythm of this accumulation depends on the average rate 
of profit, and the level of this rate depends in its turn on the consolidation 
and expansion of pre-capitalist relationships in the peripheral areas’.70 Behind 
their formal dispute about ‘characterisation’, the two arguments shared this 
single premise: whether one characterised the forms of economy in Latin 
America as ‘feudal’ or as ‘capitalist’ – that is, whether one ‘deduced’ their 
character from one or other of the two simple abstractions specifi ed earlier – 
the point was that the world-economy evolved in this period as a response 
to the expansion of industrial capitalism. If this was so evident both to Frank 
and Laclau, the only ‘problem’ which remained was the formal problem of 
characterisation: ‘the problem is to define in each case the specifi city of the 
exploitative relationship in question’ – which was no different from saying 
that there was in fact no problem at all, or that the problem was purely formal, 
because this so-called ‘specifi city’ was already self-evident at the level of 
the simple abstraction. For example, for the plantations, it required literally 
only a single sentence to establish this ‘specificity’: ‘in the plantations of the 
West Indies’, Laclau wrote, ‘the economy was based on a mode of production 
constituted by slave labour’.71 It was as simple as that. 
 
Inherent in this form of argument – not peculiar to Laclau or Frank, but 
deeply entrenched in the whole tradition of ‘Marxism’ inherited from the 1920s–  
is the following underlying premise, which is inseparably bound up 
with the formal problematic of ‘characterisation’: in all phases of its evolution, 
the structure of the world-economy posits only one element of explanation, 
namely, the demands of capital-reproduction. From this, it follows that modes 
of production other than capital which coexist within the structure of that 
economy fi gure only as ‘specific’ forms of subjugation of labour perpetuated 
over time by the requirements of industrial accumulation. These are ‘modes 
of production’ entirely deprived of their own laws of motion, vegetating on 
the periphery of an industrialising Europe like a vast reserve of labour-power 
periodically called into action by the spasmodic expansions of metropolitan 
capital. For purposes of propaganda, it would be entirely adequate to relate 
the existence of slavery in the cotton plantations to the requirements of the 
English textile industry, or the intensified exploitation of serf-labour in the 
grain-exporting nations of Eastern Europe to the fact that capital requires 
a large volume of grain at low prices. But Marx was aware that a scientifi c 
enquiry was an entirely different sort of exercise to a propagandistic tract, and 
it was this awareness that initially distinguished Marxism from Ricardian and 
petit-bourgeois socialism. 
2.5. Slavery and the world-market 
2.5.1. ‘Slavery’ 
To start with this ‘mode of production constituted by slave labour’, it is 
a striking fact, impossible to ignore, that within the Marxist tradition, as 
outside it, the slave-plantations of the American South were never always 
as simply characterised as Laclau imagines. For example: Marx wrote that 
in the English colonies which produced tobacco, cotton, sugar, the colonists 
acted ‘like people, who, driven by motives of bourgeois production, wanted 
to produce commodities . . .’.72 He described these plantations as enterprises 
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of ‘commercial speculation’ in which ‘a capitalist mode of production exists, 
if only in a formal sense…The business in which slaves are used is conducted 
by capitalists’.73 He described the exploitation of slave-labour as a 
‘factor in a calculated and calculating system’, driven by the compulsion 
to produce ‘surplus value’.74 Commenting on this passage, Preobrazhensky 
spoke of ‘undeveloped, transitional forms of surplus-value, which are not 
completely characteristic of a developed capitalist mode of production’.75 On 
the other hand, for Kautsky, the slave-plantations of America were a form 
of ‘large-scale production of a pre-capitalist type’.76 Lenin, who accepted this 
characterisation directly under Kautsky’s infl uence, later argued, in a polemic 
on American agriculture, that there was really ‘no foundation for the common 
practice [sic] of classifying the [slave] latifundia as capitalist enterprises’, that 
these latifundia were ‘frequently [sic] survivals of pre-capitalist relationships – 
slave-owning, feudal or patriarchal’ which typically manifested the lowest 
percentages of ‘improved acreage’.77 Much more recently, in one of his books, 
Genovese argues that the ‘slave regime in the British Caribbean bore the 
clear stamp of capitalist enterprise’, and that sugar was grown on ‘large 
plantations of a decidedly bourgeois type’ run by ‘capitalist slaveholders’.78 
But earlier, in his major work of interpretation, Genovese had also written, 
this time with reference to the American plantations, ‘the planters were not 
mere capitalists [sic], they were pre-capitalist, quasi-aristocratic landowners 
who had to adjust their economy and ways of thinking to a capitalist world 
market…’. 79 
 
In a review of the Frank-Laclau debate, Jay Mandle thought the plantations 
were ‘intensely profit-oriented commercial enterprises’ and the plantation 
owners ‘profit-maximizing entrepreneurs’, i.e. capitalists as we normally 
understand them, but added, to be on the safe side, that their exploitation of 
slave-labour made it ‘impossible by Dobb’s definition to classify them as capitalist’.80 
In fact, as we know, with the single exception of Lenin, the major argument 
proposed by all other writers against classifying the slave-plantations as 
a form of capitalist enterprise was precisely that ‘by Dobb’s definition’, by virtue 
of his ‘virtual identity’, they could not be so because they exploited slave labour.81  
Lenin himself proposed a quite different argument, and one which, 
as we shall see in a moment, contained a substantial insight, namely, that 
the level of technique and the extensive character of such an enterprise were 
suffi cient to preclude their characterisation as ‘capitalist’ in the strict sense 
in which the various other types of agricultural enterprise in other zones of 
America were ‘capitalist’. It would have made practically no sense for Lenin 
to have argued that the prevalence of slave labour as such made the plantations 
‘precapitalist’, because, quite apart from his early descriptions of the 
various ‘medieval’ forms of capitalism prevalent in the Russian countryside, 
he also wrote, in that period: ‘Our literature frequently contains too stereotyped 
an understanding of the theoretical proposition that capitalism requires 
the free, landless worker…’; this was true, Lenin argued, as ‘indicating the 
main trend’ (cf. Section 3.1 above where I referred to wage-labour in its simple 
determination, i.e., free labour, as the necessary basis for capitalism as the 
generalised form of social production), but agrarian capitalism was compatible 
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with unfree labour at specific stages in its evolution.82 
 
To indicate only briefly, and entirely by way of hypothesis, the framework 
for a more rigorous Marxist understanding of the slave-plantations: 
we argued earlier that the analysis of a given historical form of production 
treats its constituent enterprise basically as a unit of production, an entity 
governed by specifi c economic laws, and regards the emergence of its specifi c 
form of organisation of the labour-process, the process which corresponds to 
its laws of motion, only as a moment of its ‘crystallisation’. The slave-plantations 
were commodity-producing enterprises characterised by speculative 
investments (‘centres of commercial speculation’) in the production of 
absolute surplus-value on the basis of landed property. Production was carried 
on in such enterprises at low, ‘capital-specific’ techniques which posited 
enlarged simple cooperation subject to economies of scale.83 Accumulation in 
this form of speculative capitalist enterprise asserted itself only in the long 
run, as a relatively slow and mainly sporadic tendency dominated by feudal 
modes of consumption. The progress of such an enterprise would thus present 
the external aspect of a series of simple reproduction-cycles expanding 
slowly to higher levels according to a discontinuous and bunched rhythm of 
investments. At the level of all enterprises, this purely quantitative character 
of accumulation84 and its ‘natural’ basis in the ownership of land (here, the 
capitalist and landlord being one and same person, as Marx indicated) would 
progressively convert the excess of commodity-values over prices of production 
inherent in the low technical composition of capital85 into ‘surplus-profits’ 
appropriated by the slaveowners themselves as ‘absolute rent’.86 For we know 
that historically plantation land of a specifi c fertility would become, progressively 
a monopoly of only the most substantial or at least earlier-established 
slaveowners, and thus present a ‘barrier’ to the free investment of capital, as 
much as land incorporated as feudal property constituted such a barrier and 
thus generated ‘absolute rent’. It follows that, even when cost-prices rose as 
the natural fertility of the soil declined through intensive exploitation at stagnant 
levels of technique, a crisis of profitability could be postponed indefinitely 
for a certain range of market-prices. 
 
This specific form of enterprise therefore differs from the classical form of 
capitalist enterprise mainly in its lower intensity of accumulation and in the 
fact that accumulation is here compatible with a constant composition of capital, 
and therefore with stagnant or declining levels of labour-productivity. 
Increases in the rate of exploitation depend not on the conversion of necessary 
labour into surplus-labour, i.e. the production of relative surplus-value, but 
on an intensifi cation of labour or on a lengthening of the working-day to the 
limits of physical endurance. The self-expansion of value no longer figures as 
an entirely autonomous and dominating force compelling each enterprise to 
reduce cost-prices to a minimum, but acquires a purely relative and sporadic 
existence as a function of feudally-dominated habits of consumption and 
display. Plantation-profits, we know, financed not only the (quantitative) 
expansion of the enterprise itself, but, probably to an even greater extent, 
peerages, marriage-alliances, seats in parliament and the purchase of feudal 
properties.87 In short, the slave-plantations were capitalist enterprises of a patriarchal 
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and feudal character producing absolute surplus-value on the basis of 
slave-labour and a monopoly in land. This heterogeneous and, as it appears, 
disarticulated nature of the slave-plantation generated a series of contradictory 
images when the early Marxist tradition, not equipped with the same 
abundance of material available today, attempted its first characterisations. 
2.5.2. The nascent world-market 
The sugar produced by enterprises of this nature in the Caribbean and 
exported by them mainly to England, France and Holland, became the leading 
item of a major re-export trade within Europe itself in the course mainly 
of the seventeenth century.88 Given the circumscribed and localised distribution 
of a specifically bourgeois class in Europe at that time, the growth of 
this re-export trade suggests that the demand for sugar and other types of 
plantation-produce was not confi ned exclusively to the established mercantile 
or incipient industrial-capitalist classes of England or Holland. Moreover, 
we know also that the period when English sugar displaced Brazilian sugar 
from the markets of northern Europe was itself a period of rapid English 
commercial expansion in the Baltic. The deeper meaning of this connection 
becomes evident when we note that, throughout this period, and in fact much 
earlier, Europe had been divided into three more-or-less distinct price-zones 
whose centres of gravity tended to fl uctuate while preserving a certain basic 
uniformity. On the eve of the seventeenth century, according to the price series 
constructed by Braudel and Spooner, the price of grain in England, 
France or Holland was 200–300% higher than the price of Polish grain.89 The 
growing volume of grain-exports from the port of Danzig had become a 
crucial mechanism in stabilising grain-prices in those countries in the period 
of rapid demographic reconstruction and currency-depreciation which began 
around 1570. So intense was this integration of Polish grain into the economy 
of Western Europe that Pokrovsky wrote in the History of Russia: ‘The price 
of rye in Danzig determined the cost of living in Madrid or Lisbon’,90 and 
Marian Małowist tells us that ‘every disturbance in the delivery of grain from 
the coasts of the Baltic, especially from Poland, produced a rise in the cost 
of living in Holland and other provinces of the Low Countries…’.91 But how 
were the English, Dutch or Portuguese to pay for these imports? Before the 
export of English textiles to Portugal helped to balance England’s trade with 
the Baltic by sucking bullion out of Portugal,92 this role of payments-mechanism 
in the expanding grain-trade devolved partly on the export wool-trade, 
which required a massive drive to expropriate the domestic peasantry, and 
partly on the re-export of colonial produce to the feudal classes of Eastern 
Europe. From this, we can draw two conclusions. Firstly, the demand which 
sustained production in the capitalist slave-enterprises of the West Indies 
depended to some degree on the expansion of feudal incomes in the grain-
exporting 
zones of Eastern Europe. Secondly, these enterprises were compelled 
to operate within a framework of mercantilist control because colonial 
produce, as an element of feudal consumption, became one important means 
of fi nancing grain-imports from the feudal estates. In the seventeenth century, 
at any rate, the world-economy presented a vastly different picture from 
the industrially-dominated world-market of the nineteenth which formed 
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the basis for the early Marxist theories of imperialism. For, at that stage, the 
structure of world-exchanges linked the capitalist slave-plantations of the 
Atlantic to feudal estates in Poland through a complicated network of basically 
mercantile and fi nancial interests centred in Amsterdam and London. 
Each of these enterprises fitted into this structure of the world-economy as 
specifi c autonomous units of production driven by their own laws of motion. 
If this is evident for the slaveowners, ‘driven by motives of bourgeois production’, 
it now has to be established for the Polish estates. 
2.6. Feudal production 
2.6.1. The estate 
The feudal economy was an economy of consumption based on a level of technique 
that was so rudimentary that a single aristocratic household required 
for its support a vast arable area. In the earliest period for which estateinventories 
become available, the ratio of output to seed barely exceeded 2:1. 
In Europe, on the eve of the fourteenth century, after a long swing of slow 
agricultural progress connected with improvements in ploughing technique 
and a gradually expanding triennial rotation, maximum grain-yields oscillated 
around 4:1. Finally, as late as the eighteenth century, both in the fertile 
Po Valley of northern Italy and in the black-earth region of Russia, the major 
cereals gave a yield of 3–5.1.93 For this low productivity of labour, the estate, 
the basic enterprise of feudal production, compensated by practising an 
extensive economy. As the level of technique progressed only slowly, over 
several centuries, as our figures indicate, the estate’s output was a function 
of the surface in production, and the surface which the lord could bring into 
production in any given period was a function of the disposable mass of 
labour-power.94 The limits to the mobilisation of this mass of labour-power, 
when not determined technically by the available quantity of draught-animals, 
were imposed socially by the relation of forces, the possibility of fl ight 
and the relative degree of ‘overpopulation’. The average volume of output 
was thus determined ultimately by the socially disposable mass of labourtime.95 
 
As a form of enterprise, the feudal estate normally consisted of separate 
manorial units related metabolically as parts of a single economic organism 
centred on the lord’s household. The structure of these units varied from those 
in which demesne arable was of no significance and feudal incomes consisted 
mainly of monetary payments based on tithes and seigneurial rights [seigneurie 
banale], to others in which demesne economy based on slave- or serf-labour 
predominated. In the feudal epoch as a whole, the estate’s economy generated 
two relatively distinct modes of organisation of the labour-process. The first 
of these, defined by the insignificance of demesne, posited a higher elasticity 
of surplus in the peasant-sector and a distribution of arable between peasant- 
holdings and demesne, which conferred on the former the character of 
a sector of small peasant-production, with the peasants disposing of the whole 
of their labour-time; here the rate of feudal exploitation was not immediately 
evident in the ratio of the two arables. In the second mode of organisation of 
the labour-process the peasant-holding was a ‘subsistence plot’ or ‘wage in 
kind’,96 and the totality of these holdings a sector of simple reproduction;97 
here, the distribution of the peasants’ necessary and surplus labour-time 
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would tend to coincide directly with the distribution of arable between peasant- 
holdings and lord’s demesne. Taking the feudal epoch as a whole, the 
peasant-holdings thus figured in two determinate forms and functions: as 
small peasant-farms capable of generating a more or less substantial surplus 
over the peasants’ immediate requirements of consumption, and as subsistence 
plots adapted to the reproduction of labour-power. As the organisation 
of the labour-process became effective within the framework of the manor, 
and as most estates comprised several manors, the ratio of demesne arable 
to peasant arable would tend to fl uctuate quite sharply between the different 
manors, estates and regions, and the size of peasant holdings [manses] to 
vary even more sharply at any given time. In general, a casual survey suggests 
that the area occupied by demesne varied between 13% and 45% of the 
total area of a given estate or manor, with a tendency to vary inversely with 
the size of these units; while peasant-holdings ranged from miniscule plots 
of 10 acres or less to substantial farms of 100 acres. If we now ask which of 
these forms constituted the classical or fully developed structure of the feudal 
enterprise, the answer should not be diffi cult: the enterprise only ‘crystallised’, 
that is, acquired its classical structure, when the ratio of the peasants’ 
necessary to surplus labour-time was directly refl ected in the distribution of 
arable between demesne and peasant-holding. In other words, the form of 
organisation of the labour-process specific to the feudal mode of production 
in its developed form would be one which permitted the lord to assert complete 
control over the labour-process itself – in which the peasant-holdings 
assumed the form of, and functioned as, a sector of simple reproduction. 
 
Within the framework of this type of economy, and regardless of the structure 
of the labour-process, the production of wealth was subordinated to 
habits of generosity, display and consumption. Pirenne maintained that, in 
the ‘patriarchal’ organisation of the big estates, the notion of ‘profits’ in the 
sense of value which expands itself, was utterly alien;98 as we know, the only 
‘investments’ which such an enterprise ever undertook were those which 
were strictly necessary for the requirements of simple reproduction (and 
mainly, the periodic reconstitution of manorial livestock). In this sense, the 
lord’s consumption constituted the only ‘motor-force’ of expansion in the feudal 
economy.99 
 
Yet Pirenne’s conception of the estate as a ‘patriarchal’ organisation is 
misleading (and did, in fact, mislead Sweezy). The determining role of consumption 
did not imply an ideal of isolationism, or any basic economic irrationality. 
We know that, as the twelfth century progressed, a large number of 
agricultural treatises appeared which regarded agriculture as a ‘mechanical 
art’ worthy of scientifi c interest and capable of systematic improvement. We 
know that, in gradually going over to a triennial rotation, the estates spread 
the risks of a bad harvest more widely, for in years when excessive moisture 
destroyed the winter-crops, spring-grain would come to the rescue. Above all, 
of course, we know that when the demand for agricultural produce expanded, 
demesne-cultivation accounted for a major share of the marketed output. The 
fact that, in phases of rapid infl ation, estates would tend to convert from fi xed 
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monetary payments to ‘direct management’ implies that some mechanism of 
‘opportunity-cost’ calculation operated. But the spread of these ‘business-like’ 
attitudes, as they were characterised by Sweezy,100 was not only compatible 
with the character of the feudal economy as an economy of consumption, but 
inseparably tied to it. In a sense, this compatibility and basic link between 
feudal consumption and business-like attitudes is the central point. The 
consumption- 
requirements of the nobility and the perpetual need to adjust the 
level of income to rates of consumption were the most powerful determinants 
in drawing both lord and peasant into production for the market: the 
lord directly through the consolidation of a demesne-economy, the peasant 
indirectly through the expanding weight of monetary payments. In phases of 
ascending production for the market (England c. 1250, Poland and Hungary c. 1600) 
it is quite probable that most commodity-producing estates rarely sold 
less than half their net output. For example, on the 32 dependent manors of 
the Bishop of Winchester for which detailed time-series are available, in average 
years close to 80% of net output was sold; on 6 of the Duchy of Lancaster’s 
manors in Wiltshire, 90%.101 Even outside periods of high grain prices, the 
proportion of marketed output was fairly high: c. 1150 one of the manors of 
the abbey of Cluny was selling the whole of its wheat-output and 33% of its 
output of rye;102 two hundred years later, when demesne-production was in 
partial decline in the West, but the full impact of the incipient recession had 
still to come, a small estate in Essex for which fi gures are available, reserved 
21% of its total wheat-receipts for seed, paid 19% in wages to workers on the 
demesne, sent 23% to the lord’s household for direct consumption, and sold 
the remaining 30%, which comes to 37% of net output (deducting seed).103 If 
these preliminary examples do not suffi ce, a different order of evidence might 
be used. The ‘maximisation of sales’ became a major slogan of the various 
treatises addressed to the Russian nobility of the eighteenth century. According 
to Confino, 
the basic idea underlying the economic treatises of this period was the 
realization of profi ts and expansion of feudal incomes: these became the 
major goal of the estate’s economic activity, the main obsession of the 
pomescik and the chief duty of the bailiffs…Ryckov’s book of instructions 
to estate-managers began, ‘Our main interest in this book is how the income 
and profi ts of the lord may be expanded’.104 
In another treatise, Bolotov described the most competent estate-managers 
as those who could maximise the volume of sales at the best price, while 
ensuring the immediate consumption-needs of the household.105 
Far from facing the ‘alternatives’ of producing for the market or producing 
for ‘use’,106 most estates were organised according to a certain internal specialisation, 
with some manorial units producing mainly or entirely for the market 
and others for household-consumption. In both aspects, the organisation of 
the estate was a function of the socially determined consumption needs of the 
lords. In their consciousness, commercial production and feudal ‘subsistence’ 
were not separate, confl icting aspects of their social practice as a class, for, as 
one of the Russian treatises indicated, the production of feudal profi ts was 
geared to the goal of feudal consumption.107 
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This preliminary outline of the basic characteristics of the estate is sufficient 
to imply two conclusions. (i) Production for the market did not entail competition 
between the different enterprises. What was mainly important to this 
type of enterprise was the preservation of a certain proportionality between 
income and consumption, not the rapid expansion of incomes from one year 
to the next on the example of a capitalist firm. In a capitalist economy, the 
market exerts its domination over each individual enterprise by compelling 
it to produce within the limits of a socially average level of productivity. The 
existence of this social average posits a mechanism of cost-calculation which 
was absent in conditions of feudal production. To be more precise, for a bourgeois 
enterprise, the ‘absolute limit of exploitation’ is constituted by the average 
profi t of capital; for the small-commodity producer who sells the whole 
of his output, the limit is set by the costs of simple reproduction, comprising 
mainly his ‘wage’. In the medieval world, as feudal consumption became 
bound up with the expanding currents of circulation and implied progressively 
higher levels of monetary expenditure, a specifically feudal structure 
of accounting tended to crystallise: ‘costs’ were defined mainly as those items 
of expenditure which required an outlay of cash, and ‘profits’ as all items of 
monetary receipt. As items of expenditure, the elements of consumption and 
production were merged into a common category, something like the ‘sum of 
all expenses’, which was then deducted from receipts to obtain an apparently 
spurious ‘net balance’.108 This ratio of receipts to expenditure was calculated 
as the ratio of two consolidated sums; even when, on the side of income, the 
proceeds from the sale of various crops figured as separate items of receipt, 
costs of production were distributed under various agricultural operations, 
so that no attempt was made to determine individual monetary costs of production, 
or even the monetary costs of crop production as a whole. As all 
items of cash-income were regarded as ‘profits’, independently of any mechanism 
of cost-calculation, crops were more or less ‘profitable’, not according to 
their monetary rate of profit but according to the volume of cash which they 
brought in.109 Any increment in crop-production which increased the total 
volume of these receipts, however marginal its contribution, was therefore 
‘profitable’. That is to say, for a given distribution of productive forces, even 
if it made sense to sell a given output at the highest price, sales would nonetheless 
continue over a wide range of prices below this bound. In short, in 
an economy which dissociated production from the ‘rational’ calculation of 
costs and which regarded ‘profits’ not as a ratio but as a simple magnitude, 
the ‘limit of exploitation’ could only be a vague and elastic concept, and one 
which could assert itself only in the longer run in a sort of feudal ‘scissor’s crisis’, 
as the hiatus between income and consumption widened over a number 
of years. 
 
(ii) Once the estates established a certain connection with the market, the 
lord’s income became a function of three variables: (a) the volume of gross 
output, which would tend to fluctuate sharply from one year to the next; (b) 
the coefficient of the marketable surplus, whose elasticity would vary more 
or less directly in proportion to gross output; (c) the current price of grain.110 
As no estate had any control over prices, an expansion of manorial incomes 
depended mainly on expanding the marketable surplus. As the level of internal 
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consumption was more-or-less constant, the volume of this surplus, sold 
on the market, would vary proportionately to the volume of the harvest. 
At the existing level of technique, the average productivity over time was a 
function of the surface in production and therefore of the disposable mass of 
labour-time. It follows that, in these conditions, the ‘maximisation’ of feudal 
profits necessarily implied incursions into the sector of small-peasant production, 
from which the estates drew their sources of labour. 
2.6.2. Peculiarities of the ‘second serfdom’ 
The feudal mode of production prevailed in England, for example, in its 
period of ‘high farming’ c. 1230, as well as in Poland c. 1600, when most of 
Western Europe was becoming heavily dependent on Polish grain exports. In 
England in that period, as in Poland, the larger and better-organised estates 
were extensively involved in the production of grain for the market, selling 
up to 80% of net output. But a deeper comparison would reveal differences 
of some interest. Of England, we are told by Duby, 
to associate the tenants with the labour of the demesne in the thirteenth 
century was an anachronism…The revival of forced labour seems, therefore, 
to have been very limited: it was only temporary, since it declined definitely 
on the monastic estates after 1275, and was restricted in scope, since labor 
services 
were only used to reinforce those of manorial employees.111 
Seventeenth-century Poland, on the other hand, was experiencing a substantial 
feudal offensive, with the nobility beginning to ‘limit the area of their peasant’s 
cultivation, and, in this way, enlarge their own land’.112 If we take these 
cases as prototypes of the fi rst and second serfdoms respectively, it is clear 
that the tendency of demesne-consolidation at the cost of peasant-production, 
which they both reveal, prevailed with varying degrees of intensity in these 
conjunctures. The extent to which it prevailed and the intensity of its effects 
were a function of broader economic factors. The possibility of expanding 
manorial incomes or safeguarding feudal consumption by means other than 
direct management depended mainly on the elasticity of the surplus in 
smallpeasant 
production, while demesne farming could itself be organised mainly 
on the basis of paid labour. At any rate, whether estates converted to monetary 
payments or retained demesne-cultivation with the use of paid labour, both 
processes posited a certain level of currency-circulation. At a deeper level of 
analysis, therefore, the first significant contrast between the epoch of ‘high 
farming’ and the ‘second serfdom’, between the two extremities of Europe, is 
located here. In the West, the enormously expanding weight of the seigneurie 
banale on which Duby lays so much stress in his most recent work,113 and the 
growing volume of monetary payments by the peasantry implied proportionate 
increases both in the stock of money and in the velocity of its circulation. 
The leasing of demesne-lands, the imposition of jurisdictional taxes, entryfi 
nes and ‘permanent rents’, the movement of commutation and the growing 
volume of peasant-indebtedness – all cash-transactions or transactions based 
mainly on cash – make no sense on any other assumption. In relative terms, 
the level of currency-circulation was quite different in the East: in Poland, it 
actually diminished in the early part of the seventeenth century, compelling 
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the nobility to adapt to this situation by intensifying the economic isolation 
of the estate and establishing in this way, as Kula remarks, a ‘mechanism 
of closed monetary operations’.114 In the second place, conversion to monetary 
payments required a peasantry capable of producing for the market; 
and these surpluses would tend to derive mainly from the more substantial 
households. Although, in the West, the expanding weight of population after 
the early phases of arable colonisation led into a spontaneous fragmentation 
of most peasant manses, both the gradual improvements in productivity and 
the relaxation of feudal pressures on the peasant’s surplus had enabled this 
sort of peasantry to establish itself. Once the structure of feudal exploitation 
itself became more diversified and fluid, this sector of the peasantry, the 
real base of peasant commodity-production in the feudal social formations, 
could consolidate its position to an even greater extent. In the East, the whole 
process of differentiation was more or less repressed up until the nineteenth 
century. The peasants’ share of the total volume of grain-sales was therefore 
never very significant – in late tsarist Russia, landlords accounted for 90% 
of the marketed output of grain, and the eventual conversion to monetary 
payments (obrok in the Russian countryside) required migrations of the peasantry 
in search of employment [otchod].115 Finally, the momentary vigour of 
demesne-farming in England was supported by an extensive use of hired 
labour and consequently closely linked to the overpopulation of the English 
countryside. Earlier conditions connected with clearance-operations and the 
expansion of arable – viz. improvements in agricultural techniques; gradual 
increases in productivity; the shift to a grain-centred system of husbandry 
and the connected shifts in the peasant’s diet; the conversion of slave-gangs 
into serf-households – all favoured a rapid growth of the serf-population. By 
the middle of the thirteenth century, as this movement of grain expansion 
came to a halt, a new phase of ‘overpopulation’ was becoming evident.116 In 
England, the proportion of serf-households which at that time was living at 
or even substantially below subsistence was close to 80%. The emergence in 
these conditions of a village-proletariat expanded the supply of labour at 
a subsistence wage, promoted the use of such labour on the medium and 
small estates insufficiently provided with villeins, and attracted even the 
bigger estates by its greater seasonal flexibility. About a third of the English 
peasant-population worked for wages in this period.117 This increasing use 
of paid labour was closely linked with the expansion of monetary payments 
and with expanding levels of currency-circulation. By contrast, in Poland, 
Ukraine, Lithuania, the low level of currency-circulation and the high level 
of wages made an extensive use of such labour practically impossible. Unlike 
the lower layers of the nobility in England, who depended largely on reserves 
of free labour, the smaller Russian landowners, the svoezemtsi, who were their 
counterparts, were compelled to work their own lands, aided by slaves.118 
‘The Russian landowners’, wrote Marx, ‘complain about two things: first, 
about the lack of money-capital…The second complaint is more characteristic. 
It is to the effect that even if one has money, not enough labourers are 
to be had at any time’.119 
 
In short, a dearth of cash, a more backward differentiation of the peasantry, 
and a scarcity of free labour were the basic conditions distinguishing the ‘second 
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serfdom’ from the so-called ‘classical’ feudalism of the medieval West. 
2.6.3. Commodity-feudalism as the pure form 
The greater intensity and more primitive character of the ‘second serfdom’ 
were thus closely conditioned by the real rhythms of economic activity 
implicit in the movement of population and currency. But this greater primitiveness 
should not be confused with a more backward development of feudal production. 
In this primitiveness of the ‘second serfdom’ we find, in fact, an important clue 
to the real logic of the feudal enterprise. In the West, which is generally 
characterised as the locus of a ‘classical’ feudalism, the estate attained its really 
classical structure, as defined earlier (Section 6.1), only sporadically, and then 
mainly in the period of ‘high farming’;  
that is, as a temporary and even abrupt prelude to the long process of 
diversification 
which followed towards the close of the thirteenth century. Surveying the 
development of the feudal economy across the whole of this early epoch, it is 
undeniable that, as feudal enterprises, the estates in the medieval West possessed 
a far more fl uid and diversifi ed structure than those which sustained 
the second serfdom. There, labour-services were for at least two centuries 
(centuries central to the epoch of ‘classical’ feudalism), a less powerful pressure 
on the peasant’s labour-time than the seigneurie banale, as Duby argues. 
Even in the brief outburst of high farming, when the estates turned to commodity- 
production and attempted to compress the sector of small-peasant 
production into totally subordinate reserves of serf-labour, the largest and 
best-organised estates, such as those of the Bishop of Winchester, continued 
to derive a major share of their income from more archaic monetary payments 
and from marriage and entry-fines. Thus, the form of organisation of labour 
based on the partial autonomy of small-peasant production persisted even 
in this phase of intensifi ed labour-services. By contrast, in the central period 
of East-European feudalism, this distinction of forms was of practically no 
significance: the large mass of the peasantry were reduced to the position of 
‘serfs’, i.e. bound by labour-services; and the character of feudal enterprise 
in these countries was typically far less fl uid, far more bound up with the 
exploitation of ‘serfs’ than in the West some centuries earlier. 
In other words, the feudal enterprise in the early epoch of so-called ‘classical’ 
feudalism crystallised, or acquired its truly classical form (with the labour process 
reducing the sector of peasant-production to a reserve of simple 
reproduction), only sporadically; and then only rarely in its pure form. In the 
grain-exporting countries of the ‘second serfdom’, the predominant form of 
feudal enterprise was the developed form. The primitiveness and barbarity of 
their social relations were an expression of the maturity of feudal relations of 
production, of their relative purity. 
 
The clue to this contrast lies in the origins of the ‘second serfdom’. When 
the countries of Eastern Europe plunged into this epoch, a world-market was 
already in the process of formation. Merchant-capital had already established 
an important and expanding grain-trade, which, in the course of the fourteenth 




Marx himself, and most later Marxists, assumed as a matter of course that 
‘feudalism’ evolved by a simple progression from labour-services to monetary 
payments through an intermediate form of ‘rent in kind’. But if, in order 
to explain the peculiar connection between the purity of the ‘second serfdom’ 
and its location in an emerging world-market, we return to the early patriarchal 
Europe of the Carolingian period, we find that labour-services were 
of practically no importance on the manors of Gaul, Germany, Flanders and 
Lombardy: in this vast region of early feudal Europe, the demesne utilised 
slave-labour, and the peasantry were exploited through payments in kind.120 
In a famous article, Kosminsky set out to show that the monetary payments 
which predominated in England much later were only partly the result of 
commutation, and that a certain proportion of these payments derived from 
a more archaic structure of money-rents.121 In the debate on the ‘transition’, 
to make the point that market-relations did not accelerate the decay of forced 
labour in England, Dobb cited this article by Kosminsky; he argued that 
serfdom (labour-services) disappeared ‘earliest’ in the backward and commercially- 
remote regions of the north and west. But Kosminsky’s thesis was different:  
in these backward regions, labour-services had probably never prevailed. 
Thus, both in England and on the Continent, there were substantial 
zones where labour-services had been of little importance originally, and 
where payments assumed the form of produce or money. In Kosminsky’s 
terms, the structure of the manor evolved independently of any formative 
infl uence of payments in labour. 
 
Eastern Europe, in its own phase of backward patriarchal isolation, provides 
even clearer evidence. In Hungary, in the fifteenth century, the peasantry was 
exploited predominantly in the form of money-rents and produce-rents; Pach 
notes that a demesne-economy as such had barely developed at this stage.122 
Around this period, in Mecklenburg, Prussia, Bohemia, Poland and Russia 
feudal incomes derived, as in Hungary, mainly in the form of cash- and kind 
payments.123 
The significance of this fact is enormous. It suggests that not only did the 
crystallisation of feudal relations of production find its only true and widespread 
expression in the ‘second serfdom’ (i.e. the more backward eastern 
periphery of Europe); but the feudal estate only crystallised (i.e., acquired its 
developed, ‘adequate’ form) not in the relative isolation of a Europe cut off 
from markets and forced to depend on local production, but precisely when 
the estate itself assumed the character of a commodity-producing enterprise. 
Labour-services, Kosminsky had argued, were more strongly represented in 
the most populated and industrialised areas with the biggest markets.124 That 
is to say, insofar as the feudal enterprise tended to crystallise in its pure form 
in the earlier epoch of feudalism, the context was an expanding market. The 
history of the ‘second serfdom’ substantiates this point, if only because the 
process of crystallisation here was neither held back nor obscured by the survival 
of a specifically small-peasant production, and by the correspondingly 
more fl uid nature of the enterprise. As the countries of Eastern Europe were 
drawn into production for the emerging world-market or for an expanding 
domestic market (which was the case in Hungary), labour-services advanced 
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rapidly against both earlier forms of payment. This type of exploitation was 
thus a later development, and it reached its maximum intensity in agricultural 
regions close to urban centres, (for example, the zones surrounding 
Moscow and St. Petersburg), or in the hinterland of the port cities and major 
trade-routes.125 The chronological distribution of labour-services shows the 
same pattern. In the second half of the sixteenth century – to cite only one 
example – as cereal-prices in the port of Danzig increased on average by some 
200% over fifty years under the pressure of expanding exports, the volume 
of labour-time mobilised from a full-sized peasant-holding on the estates 
increased by over 400%. Every favourable price conjuncture intensifi ed the 
drive to expand the demesne at the cost of small-peasant production and to 
increase the volume of disposable serf labour-time both directly by imposing 
heavier work obligations and indirectly by a policy of cutting the size of the 
peasant-plot. The process of evolution of the classical manor, which the countries 
of the West, in particular England, had experienced in a relatively mild 
and impure form, was destined to be repeated at higher levels of intensity, 
without the same impurities, in Prussia, Denmark, Poland and Hungary;126 
and, finally, Russia, in the period inaugurated by the ‘revolution of the world 
market’ 
in the sixteenth century. Under the impact of successive commercial 
booms, the European dimensions of which were already evident as early as 
the fourteenth century,127 the estates, formerly relying on produce in kind or, 
to a limited extent, rents in cash, converted small-peasant production into a 
reserve of simple reproduction: a process described by Pokrovsky as the 
serfowner’s 
leap into ‘new and more complicated forms of production’.128 
 
But this process was not peculiar to the countries of Eastern Europe: it had 
been known much earlier, not only, on a limited scale, in the West, but also in 
China; and was found at that time and later in the major countries of colonial 
Latin America. We know that in the major countries of Latin America the 
form which the feudal estate assumed was the hacienda. The hacienda was an 
enterprise ‘always dependent on a fairly large market for its products’.129 Both 
major phases of expansion of the hacienda in Chile, for example, coincided and 
were closely tied up with the expansion of demand for Chilean grain. The 
hacendado could expand his volume of sales in such periods only by transforming 
peasant production into feudally-subjugated simple reproduction. In the 
course of successive booms, the older arrendatario gradually disappeared from 
the countryside of central Chile, replaced by a new serf-population of inquilinos 
concentrated in the areas which produced for the wheat-market. Peasantlivestock 
rapidly disintegrated in this process, peasant-holdings degenerated 
into subsistence-plots, and the earlier more deeply differentiated structure of 
the peasant-population, separating more prosperous tenant-households from 
the remainder, collapsed into a more or less uniformly impoverished mass.130 
In China, the same tendencies are evident some ten centuries earlier. Here, 
already in the T’ang epoch, the big estate had become a common feature of 
rural economy; but, in that period, before the commercial boom of the eleventh 
century, the tenants [tien-hu] who worked these estates under the control 
of bailiffs were generally bound by payments in kind, equivalent to half the 
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crop. On the Sung estates, especially those of the prosperous coastal provinces 
of the south where ‘wheat was grown purely as a cash-crop for sale in the cities 
of the lower Yangtze area’,131 the same tenants were progressively bound 
by labour-services and their mobility restricted in law. A substantial number 
of Sung estates worked by these serf-households ‘produced either regularly 
or intermittently for the market’.132 The parallel between the condition of such 
Sung peasants and the serf-populations of Europe was suffi ciently striking to 
make the Japanese Marxist historians who pioneered Sung economic history 
date the transition to feudalism in China precisely at this conjuncture, when 
the whole southern economy was transformed by the rapid growth of cities, 
expanding levels of monetary circulation, a vast boom in the grain-trade and 
the establishment of commercial links with Europe through the intermediary 
of Arab traders. 
 
To summarise; we defined the classical or developed form of the feudal 
enterprise as one which necessarily implies the lord’s complete control over 
the labour-process; that is, where small-peasant production no longer retains 
its former autonomy but now functions in the form of a sector of simple 
reproduction, 
sustaining surplus-production on the demesne. We argued that, both 
in Europe, and elsewhere through the vast epoch of feudal production, the 
estate acquired this developed structure only as a commodity-producing 
enterprise. When Frank witnessed the signs of this specifi c evolution in the 
colonial history of Latin America, where it was repeated in a defi nite series 
of cycles, he could understand it only by reconstructing the hacienda in the 
image of capital; thus entirely ignoring the specific laws of motion according 
to which such enterprises operated; laws deriving not from the compulsion 
to accumulate, but from the compulsion to defend and improve social-consumption 
levels which rapidly lost their patriarchal (non-monetary) character, 
if they had had such a character to begin with. But, when Frank’s critics 
quickly demolished this illusion, the formal-abstract premises from which 
they started led them to the conclusion that, ‘on the contrary’, the market 
was a factor of feudal ‘consolidation’. This poses a final question, namely, the 
‘long duration’ of this type of economy, or the problem of its decline. 
2.6.4. Modes of production as objects of long duration 
The ‘long duration’ is the least perceptible, and in a sense, the slowest of all 
forms of historical time. Its effectivity is staggered across centuries, and its 
reality only measurable on that scale. Insofar as Marx conceived of modes of 
production in a broader, more truly historical sense as ‘epochs of production’ 
or ‘epochs in the economic development of society’, he implied that they were 
objects of this order of magnitude. 
 
Pirenne had argued that as commerce and the stock of money expanded, the 
old economy of subsistence and custom could no longer adjust to the new and 
more sophisticated levels of consumption; the nobles were forced to borrow 
and their régime disintegrated. Even earlier than Pirenne, Weber had posed 
the question in similar terms; for him, the ‘immediate cause’ of the breakdown 
of the ‘manorial system’ had been the development of market-operations and 
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market-interests on the part of both lords and peasants, although the major 
impetus derived, in his view, from the nascent commercial bourgeoisie of the 
towns who promoted the dissolution of the manor because ‘it limited their 
own market opportunities’.133 As a collapse-theory, the Pirenne-Weber thesis 
was obviously wrong: over short conjunctures, most estates were clearly 
capable of adapting to the market and expanding incomes.134 Expanding levels 
of demand and the growing weight of monetised consumption could be 
sustained over a cycle of short conjunctures by stepping up the rate of jurisdictional 
income; intensifying demesne-exploitation; substituting short-term 
leases or exacting entry-fines to siphon off the cash-holdings of more substantial 
peasants or to profit directly from inflation. Impressed by these short 
conjunctures in which the best estates in particular demonstrated their ability 
to prosper, Dobb concluded that the market was a factor of consolidation, and 
that the decline of feudalism lay ‘within’ the ‘sphere’ of production, in the 
static levels of labour-productivity which would eventually compel the lords 
to overexploit their serfs and reduce their rates of reproduction.135 Neither 
Dobb nor Sweezy saw that, to make any sense at all, their respective ‘theories’ 
of feudal decline posited each other; and neither posed the question of the 
durational scale over which each position could hold true when integrated 
with the other. The ‘market’ and the ‘overexploitation of serf-labour’ were 
not relatively independent phenomena, or factors which simply ‘interacted’, 
as both Dobb and Sweezy conceded in their moments of generosity. They 
were indissolubly linked aspects of a single process, the ‘long duration’ of feudal 
production. 
 
In large areas of Europe, and outside Europe, the feudal estate acquired 
its classical or developed form only as a commodity-producing enterprise. 
In countries such as Hungary, Poland, Russia, and later in certain parts of 
the colonial world, the expansion of a demesne-economy and labour-services 
which had formerly been of little or no signifi cance, began directly with and 
under the pressure of an expanding demand for agricultural produce in local 
and international markets. This adjustment to the market suited both the 
serfowners 
and the importers of grain. It suited the latter because, in the feudal 
economies, there was no specifi c limit of exploitation which posited a certain 
level of prices. The fact that any sale brought a ‘profit’ and the perpetual 
thirst for such ‘profits’, ensured an abundant supply of grain at low prices. 
The adjustment suited the serfowners because the expansion of the market 
itself implied higher levels of monetised feudal consumption. As feudal consumption 
inevitably lost its patriarchal character; as the lure of old models 
of consumption ceased or the civilising infl uences of an established nobility 
exerted a pressure of sophistication on the consumption-needs of cruder barbarian 
aristocracies; and as the monetary share of feudal consumption progressively 
expanded to a point where ‘internal consumption’ was of scarcely 
any importance – the thirst for cash became the dominant motive force of 
feudal production. 
 
This ‘thirst for cash’ in fact operated in all but the patriarchal periods of 
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medieval history; those exceptional conjunctures where trade declined, towns 
reverted to villages, and consumption was predominantly of a natural character. 
Once a network of world commodity-exchanges was established, it became 
an even more pervasive, more powerful factor. Driven by this thirst for cash, 
which each fall in the value of currency intensified enormously, the nobility 
reacted to the market in two distinct phases. Initially, the slowly rising levels 
of grain-prices would have automatically adjusted the rate of exploitation in 
the peasants’ favour, if, as was normally the case, the level of monetary payments 
which prevailed earlier tended to remain static. In this phase of slow 
infl ation, the lord’s first response would be a progressive readjustment of the 
level of payments to the level of prices. This was, for example, the initial reaction 
of most Russian landlords during the sixteenth century, when the Polish 
nobility not far away was already constructing the foundations of a 
demesneeconomy. 
In Russia, ‘the increase in cash obrok during this century just about 
kept pace with the fall in the purchasing power of the currency’.136 But, even 
in these phases of a gradual upward movement of prices, there were more 
far-sighted serf-owners who, to preserve the level of their income, turned to 
production for the market. Feudal commodity-production might originate 
then as a purely defensive manoeuvre, as in England, where ‘in the face of the 
tendency for prices to rise, a more or less static income encouraged borrowing 
in order to sustain a customary level of consumption…The abandonment of 
leasing might be a step towards solvency and a means of safeguarding 
consumption 
standards’.137 Then, as the infl ation periodically accelerated, more 
and more estates would be drawn into production for the market; and this 
compulsion would be so much stronger where feudal rates of consumption, 
now expanding more quickly in money-terms, pushed against the limits of a 
low elasticity of surplus in peasant-production and a low velocity of circulation 
in local markets. 
 
Under the pressure of successive infl ationary conjunctures of this type, a 
new and distinct phase of feudal production would begin, a phase of crystallisation, 
with demesne-arable expanding by incursions into fallow, forests, 
pasture and grazing land. At low and generally static levels of productivity, 
output was limited mainly by the extent of arable in cultivation; and the expansion 
of arable required a proportionate expansion of the disposable mass of 
labour-time. The construction of demesne-economy, the process through 
which the feudal enterprise acquired its adequate form, implied a series of 
sharp and brutal inroads into peasant-land and a vast project of mobilising 
labour-power from the surrounding villages. This unwritten history of the 
‘primitive accumulation’ of feudal economy evokes its most striking expression 
in the ‘second serfdom’, only because in the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic, the relatively sudden nature of their integration into the emerging 
world-economy compacted the process into a matter of decades. Where 
labour-services had existed formerly, their specifi cally low weight, at most 
one day per week, implied a basic compatibility with small-scale production. 
In the phase of crystallisation, with the weight of these services rising by several 
hundred per cent over a few decades, small-peasant production would be 
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more or loss rapidly converted into pockets of simple reproduction. The division 
between the peasant’s necessary and surplus labour-time would now be 
directly encapsulated in the distribution of arable, with the peasant’s holding 
fl uctuating around the limits of subsistence. 
 
Within the framework of this classical feudal economy with its specifi cally 
feudal organisation of the labour-process, the basic obsession of estate-management 
remained as before the adjustment of rates of income to rates of consumption, 
but now magnifi ed on the larger scale of a more labile monetary 
consumption. Where consumption had retained its patriarchal character, the 
rate of feudal income would have fl uctuated sharply from one year to the 
next because the level of technique was never suffi ciently high to dominate 
and control the stochastic cycle of production. To overcome potentially vast 
disproportions, the productive capacity of the undeveloped patriarchal estate 
would have been organised to ensure outputs above the level of current (internal) 
consumption. Once the circulation of money impinged on the organisation 
of this patriarchal economy, the curve of the new monetised feudal 
consumption would show a slow upward trend punctuated by short spasms 
of expansion with every fall in currency-values. But with income dependent 
on commercial surpluses and computed as the product of price and output, 
the inverse movements of these variables such as characterised feudal conditions 
would tend to average out the rate of revenue from year to year.138 As the 
rate of productivity tended to constancy, prices were given exogenously and 
rates of consumption were infl exible downwards, the estate could respond to 
this growing crisis of profi tability by heavy borrowings, by the liquidation of 
assets, or by increasing the volume of output, hence the surface in production 
and the mass of available labour-time. Yet each of these responses expressed 
tendencies of feudal disintegration, and the later they supervened in the long 
cycle of feudal-commodity economy, the more sharply were these tendencies 
revealed. When the consumption of the serfs already oscillated around a level 
of simple reproduction, that is, when the classical form of the feudal enterprise 
had already crystallised, every new drive to ‘maximise sales’ – that is, to push 
the level of serf-consumption below the existing limits of simple reproduction 
– would in the longer run radically shorten the periodicity of the old crises 
of subsistence and aggravate their intensity; it would thus depress the rate 
of reproduction of the serf-population to one degree or another.139 The progressive 
indebtedness and bankruptcy of the lords, the liquidation and ever 
increasing mobility of feudal property (comprising, as one of its elements, 
the serf-population itself), the compulsion to expand the volume of output or 
to expand the fi eld of feudal colonisation and the ever greater frequency of 
short-term subsistence-crises were basic long run tendencies of feudal production, 
the necessary expression of its specific laws of motion, present to one 
degree or another in all sectors of the feudal world.140 
 
In this sketch of the long duration, it is impossible to produce an abstract 
separation between the ‘market’ and the ‘process of production’ as if these were 
‘factors’ of decline. The inherent limits of the ‘process of production’ on which 
Dobb focussed in the debate were only revealed, i.e. only became effective 
as limits, in the context of expanding commodity-production or its underlying 
 31 
thirst for cash. Moreover, if, as Sweezy argued, the market was a factor of 
feudal disintegration, it could become so on the basis of the specifi c laws of 
motion of feudal economy, and only in the long run. In this sense, the debate 
argued from false premises, because the question which it posed posited a 
‘process of production’ divorced from the specific character of feudal consumption, 
and a process of exchange devoid of any compulsion to exchange. 
2.6.5. Two brief conclusions 
To relate this short discussion more closely to the themes mentioned earlier: 
(i) Although it is in some sense quite self-evident and banal, the distinction 
between ‘modes of production’ and ‘social formations’ that is generally 
drawn in most recent Marxist literature may actually obscure and mystify 
the mechanisms of modes of production. For it is a fact that, even in its crystallised 
form, the feudal enterprise was sustained by a variety of forms of 
labour; comprising domestic servants who were legally slaves and who often 
undertook the principal tasks, especially ploughing, day-labourers who were 
housed separately on the estate; part-time hired workers recruited from the 
impoverished peasantry, free tenants who performed seasonal or supplementary 
services; and the serf-population as normally understood, i.e. villeins 
bound by labour-services. The slaves and hired labourers who intervened 
in this type of economy were as much part of specifi cally feudal relations of 
production as the serf-population itself. Their intervention did not signify the 
persistence or emergence of other relations of production (‘slavery’; capitalism), 
and did not therefore imply an ‘articulation’ of several distinct ‘modes of 
production’. Consistent with the logic of his defi nitions, Dobb was, however, 
forced to argue on these lines; the fact, that, on the thirteenth-century English 
estates which turned to commodity-production, the lords made increasing 
use of hired labour, signified for him the emergence of a ‘new’, i.e., capitalist, 
mode of production. If Dobb had really believed this, the debate on the 
transition would have had to deal with a second problem: not only the decline 
of feudal economy, but the decline, in fact collapse, of the barely established 
capitalist one. For as we know, this phase of commodity-production with 
hired labour was rapidly superseded in the history of Western Europe; and, 
as Dobb himself argued, the feudal enterprise preserved its dominance, in 
progressively modifi ed forms, for at least another two centuries. Relations of 
exploitation based on the dispossession of labour, on the commodity labour power, 
become capitalist relations of production only when we can posit 
the capitalist enterprise in one of its varied forms. Marx makes the point 
indirectly when he writes: ‘if a nobleman brings the free worker together 
with his serfs, even if he re-sells a part of the worker’s product, and the free 
worker thus creates value for him, then this exchange takes place only . . . for 
the sake of superfluity, for luxury consumption’.141 In other words, hired labour 
functions in this economy as an expression of specifically feudal relations of production, 
the motive-force of which lies in the social-consumption needs of the 
owners of the feudal enterprise; it functions in an economy in which the 
production of commodities is itself only a mediation of consumption. (ii) 
The idea of world-economy as already dominated from its inception by the 
requirements of capital-reproduction is a false abstraction. To put the argument 
in its crudest form: the initial impulse which sustained the vast network 
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of world commodity-exchanges before the eighteenth century derived from 
the expanding consumption-requirements of the lords. Moreover, at its inception 
the colonisation of Latin America was a feudal colonisation, a response to 
the crisis of feudal profi tability which all the landowning classes of Europe 
were facing down to the latter part of the sixteenth century. In the Baltic and 
Eastern Europe, this crisis was partly overcome by territorial expansion into 
contiguous areas, and then displaced by the production of grain for export; 
but, in the maritime periphery of Europe, in Spain and Portugal where this 
feudal crisis recurred with periodic sharpness, it expressed itself in a movement 
of overseas-colonisation. The Spain which launched this movement of 
expansion was a Spain dominated by feudalism, but a feudalism in crisis. 
This thesis is not, of course, new: it was proposed by Vilar many years ago, 
when he described Spanish imperialism as the highest stage of feudalism;142 
and intimated some years later by Marian Małowist, when he asked whether 
the Spanish colonisation was not, to a certain extent, ‘the result of a depression 
in rural economy and a sudden drop in the revenues of the nobility’.143 
The forms which this widespread feudal crisis took in different sectors of 
Europe, its specifi c local intensity, and the means used to overcome it are 
matters for investigation by historians. Suffice it to say that the crisis of feudal 
profi tability not only unleashed movements of internal colonisation in 
Europe itself, in the land-locked territories; but the fi rst major ‘imperialist’ 
conquest; and, if we examine the question more closely, those bastardised 
forms of capitalist production which prevailed in the colonial plantations, 
the profi ts from which enabled many bankrupt noble families to re-establish 
their economic position. 
2.7. Simple-commodity production: a ‘determination of form’ 
2.7.1. The peasant mode of production 
The historical roots of all varied forms of simple-commodity production lie 
in the patriarchal-subsistence mode of production based on small-scale parcellised 
property and the exploitation of family-labour.144 This connection is 
important because when simple-commodity production arises, the economic 
logic of the more archaic patriarchal enterprise continues to dominate this form 
of production. The chief expression of this fact is that products are sold without 
regard to price of production. According to Marx, 
[The small peasant operating in this mode] regards the expenditure of 
labour as the indispensable prerequisite for the labour-product, which is 
the thing that interests him above all. But, as regards his surplus-labour, 
after deducting the necessary labour, it is evidently realized in the surplus 
product; and as soon as he can sell the latter or use it for himself, he 
looks upon it as something that cost him nothing, because it cost him no 
materialized labor…Even a sale below value and the capitalist price of 
production still appears to him as profit.145 
It follows that ‘for the peasant owning a parcel, the limit of exploitation is 
not set by the average profit of capital…The absolute limit for him…is no 
more than the wages he pays to himself, after deducting his actual costs. So 
long as the price of the product covers these wages, he will cultivate his land, and 
often at wages down to a physical minimum’.146 ‘It is not necessary, therefore, 
that the market price rise either up to the value or the price of production 
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of his product. This is one of the reasons why grain prices are lower in 
countries with predominant small peasant landownership than in countries 
with a capitalist mode of production’.147 In Kautsky’s conception, based on 
these passages of Marx, this ‘incomplete remuneration for the labour-power 
expended’ was, as Lenin notes, ‘the distinguishing feature of small production’. 
‘As long as the peasant remains a simple commodity producer, he can 
be satisfi ed with the standard of living of the wage-worker; he needs neither 
profi t nor rent; he can pay a higher price for land than the capitalist entrepreneur’.148  
In short, simple-commodity production internalises the patriarchal 
logic of the subsistence mode of production, much as feudalism does in its 
own way. Outputs are sold as a function of subsistence, and dissociated 
from any mechanism of ‘rational’ cost-calculation. In this devalorisation of 
labour-time lies the specifi c advantage of all small-scale forms of production 
threatened with extinction by the capitalistically produced commodity. In 
the epoch of capitalism, as Kautsky argued in Die Agrarfrage, ‘overwork’ and 
‘underconsumption’ become the twin slogans of the peasant-economy. 
2.7.2. The simple-commodity producer as wage-slave 
As a pure form, simple-commodity production is a form of economy of a 
purely subordinate and transitional character, in which: (i) the labour-process 
preserves its patriarchal character, with the predominance of the self-suffi - 
cient peasant family-labour farm as the basic enterprise of production. (ii) The 
producing households preserve not only their self-sufficiency, transforming 
only their surplus into commodities,149 but their independence as the basic 
agents of the productive process, chiefl y expressed in their freedom to allocate 
labour-time between commercial production and immediate consumption, 
and between the different types of commercial production. (iii) The system of 
accounting retains a specifically patriarchal, subsistence-based interpretation 
of ‘costs’ and ‘profits’, as noted above; here the ‘limit of exploitation’ is equal, 
in principle, to the costs of simple reproduction. (iv) Subsistence remains the 
goal of production, even in those limiting cases where the whole of household 
labour-time is absorbed in commercial production. (v) As the co-efficient of 
marketed output rises and the monetary components of the labour-income 
expand, the volume of sales will tend to vary inversely with the movement 
of prices (the ‘backward-sloping supply-curve’ thus typically characterises 
households in this position). (vi) Fluctuations of the market introduce a process 
of differentiation among simple-commodity producers, which, in the 
fi rst instance, remains a differentiation of wealth, i.e. preserving its historical 
content as a differentiation of simple-commodity producers.150 
 
As Marx and Lenin were aware, the subordination of the simple-commodity 
mode of production to the power of capital converts this mode into the 
embryonic basis of specifi cally capitalist production, but a capitalist production 
which retains the determinate organisation of labour specifi c to the ‘precapitalist’ 
enterprise. Marx describes this process perhaps more rigorously in 
the following passage than anywhere else: 
[The] exchange of equivalents proceeds; it is only the surface layer of a 
production which rests on the appropriation of alien labour without exchange, 
but with the semblance of exchange. This system of exchange rests on capital 
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as its foundation, and, when it is regarded in isolation from capital, as it 
appears on the surface, as an independent system, then it is a mere illusion, 
but a necessary illusion.151 
Let us examine this process more closely. 
 
The subjugation of the simple-commodity form of production to capital 
proceeds inevitably within the limits imposed by the prevailing organisation 
of production. Capital’s struggle to dominate the enterprise of simple-commodity 
producers – to determine the type, quality and volume of its commercial 
output – posits as its basis the limitations imposed on its own elasticity by 
a labour-process not determined by itself; in which, therefore the enterprise 
of small producers retains its independence, if only as a formal determination 
(‘quasi-independence’).152 Domination over the labour-process becomes 
impossible on this basis, within these limits of quasi-independence, without 
those mechanisms which uproot the patriarchal suffi ciency of the small 
enterprise. The compulsory enforced destruction of the small producer’s 
selfsufficiency figures here as the necessary foundations for the dominance of 
capital.153 
 
It follows that in this articulation, except at the limit where the enterprise 
effectively ceases to exist, where its formal independence is converted into the 
complete dependence of free labour on capital, the capitalist’s control over 
the labour-process retains a partial and sporadic character. Frequent adulterations 
of the crop, as with the cotton produced in western India in the 1860s; 
smuggling on the open market, as with poppy grown in Bengal much earlier; 
restrictions in the volume of output, such as the colonial bureaucracies persistently 
feared; and the switching to more ‘profitable’ cash-crops, reflect this 
partial and unstable character of the capitalist’s control. 
 
Yet, within the limits of such control, continually re-established on the basis 
of various coercive forms of exploitation, the relations of production which tie 
the enterprise of small-commodity producers to capital are already relations 
of capitalist production. Between the market and the small producer, capital 
intervenes with the determinate forms and specific functions of both merchant 
and industrial capital (as in the slave-plantations, two radically distinct 
‘determinate forms’ merge). In this process, two enterprises are thus present, 
a quasi-mercantile capitalist enterprise,154 which figures solely as a unit of 
production (as defined earlier) without the labour-process specifi c to its mode 
of production; and an enterprise of formally independent small producers 
functioning according to its own labour-process, inherited from the conditions 
of a patriarchal economy, and according to its own economic conceptions, also 
patriarchal in their determination, but no longer as a totally independent unit 
of production. The social process of production incorporating the immediate 
labour-process of the small-peasant enterprise is governed by the aims of 
capitalist production; namely, by the compulsion to produce surplus-value. 
Within this social process of production dominated by the capitalist enterprise, 
the economic conceptions of the small households, and their formal possession 
of a portion of the means of subsistence, enter as regulating elements only 
as a function of the law of surplus-value production. The patriarchal notions of 
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accounting, which dissociate the range of acceptable market-prices from the 
price of production and the autonomous internally subsidised reproduction 
of labour-power which from the perspective of the process as a whole, ensures 
a sale of labour-power below its value, enable capital to depress wages ‘in a 
fashion unequalled elsewhere’, as Engels noted.155 
 
When we regard the simple-commodity enterprise articulated to capital, no 
longer as an independent unit of production imposing its own laws of motion 
on the process of production, but as a quasi-enterprise with the specifi c social 
function of wage-labour (in the strict sense, value-producing labour); in other 
words, when following Marx’s method, we have correctly ‘determined its 
form’,156 some conclusions are immediately evident. In the first place, the 
‘price’ which the producer receives is no longer a pure category of exchange, 
but a category, that is, a relation, of production, a concealed wage. Behind the 
superfi cial ‘surface’ sale of products, peasants under this form of domination 
sell their labour-power. Secondly, the monopsonistic determination of ‘prices’ 
under this system, or the fact that the contracts which fi x this price may often 
also stipulate the volume of output required and its specific quality, are necessary 
expressions of the capitalist’s ‘command over labour power’.157 The more 
perceptive colonial administrators regarded such contracts ‘as of the same 
kind as one between a capitalist and a worker’.158 
 
Finally, subsistence-production now figures, under this system, as the specific 
form of reproduction of labour-power within a capitalist process of production. 
It becomes misleading, therefore, to regard it as a specific, separate mode 
of production (e.g., a ‘domestic mode of production’) in a system of modes of 
production dominated by capitalism. This was, after all, the illusion which 
Lenin polemicised against so vigorously in his earlier writings against Narodnism, 
repeatedly making the point that capitalism always takes the ‘technical 
process of production’ as it finds it. Yet this illusion is today widespread in the 
neopopulist currents of ‘Third-World political economy’ which paradoxically 
end up by reconstituting the thesis of ‘dual economy’ at the very centre of 
their analyses, now in a Marxist terminology and with slight modifi cations of 
the original premises.159 
 
In the colonial period, capitalistically-subjugated simple-commodity production, 
or, more precisely, capitalist production which is mediated through 
an internalised ‘simple-commodity producing’ enterprise, accounted for 
a major share of colonial output, when the latter did not derive from commodity- 
feudal estates or capitalist slave-plantations. The entire economy of 
certain sectors of the colonial world – West Africa, Uganda, Mozambique, 
Bengal, Burma, Cambodia – was dominated by this backward form of capitalist 
production at its various stages of crystallisation.160 In one of his very last 
references to colonial questions, Marx wrote that, with their integration into 
the world-economy, the earlier forms of production which had prevailed in 
India, China, Egypt disintegrated but that this process of disintegration was 
not initially ‘apparent’.161 The colonial peasants integrated into commodity 
production 
 36 
by a process called ‘forced commercialisation’ entered capitalist relations of 
production behind the backs of their existing forms of production: here, capitalist 
production thus retained a ‘surface layer’, an ‘appearance’ of superseded forms of 
economy, the peasants ‘retained the external attributes of independent producers’,162 
and the forms of reproduction of labour-power retained the appearance of distinct, 
even if ‘dependent’, forms of production. 
 
Thus, late nineteenth-century colonialism acquired a paradoxical character. 
In the midst of societies of apparently ‘ageless stagnation’, those that Marx 
called ‘peasant nations’,163 a form of capitalistic production had already begun 
to establish a fairly deep local penetration. The capitalism that evolved on 
the foundations of small-commodity production differed from the classical 
or adequate form of capitalist production in several fundamental ways. In the 
industrialising sectors of the world-economy, the rule of capital depended crucially 
on the dispossession of labour from all means of subsistence, or on the 
constitution of a labour-market. Wakefield, conscious of this, would advocate 
an identical programme for the white colonies. Even in the ‘peasant nations’ 
such as Egypt or India, there were sections of the bureaucracy that saw the 
proletarianisation of the peasantry as a certain and inevitable fate, as a process 
that had begun under its own rule and one that would proceed with the force 
of a natural law. This was one way of imparting a historical function to the 
famines that began to hit the peasantry more and more frequently towards 
the closing decades of that century. 
 
But, in these ‘peasant nations’, capital followed a less obvious or more 
deceptive trajectory. As it happens, it was in a note to one of Wakefield’s comments 
on the depressed condition of the Irish peasantry that Marx summed up 
this fundamental fact. He wrote, ‘In this case profit is called rent, just as it 
is called interest when, for example, as in India, the worker (although nominally 
independent) works with advances he receives from the capitalist and has 
to hand over all the surplus produce to the capitalist’.164 By ‘worker’ Marx 
meant, of course, the peasant himself, and by ‘capitalist’, the monied bourgeoisie 
of moneylenders and merchants through whom the small producer 
was brought into relation with the market. 
 
In 1859, Marx already implied that this relation was basically a capitalist 
one, but then with some uncertainty. Referring to the ‘advance system’, he 
wrote, ‘In these cases, however, money functions only in the familiar form of 
means of purchase and therefore requires no new defi nition’. But he added, 
‘Of course, capital too is advanced in the form of money and it is possible that the 
money advanced is capital advanced…’.165 It makes a lot of difference which of 
these conceptions we accept, for, as Marx himself says, the latter ‘does not lie 
within the scope of simple circulation’. That is to say, the ‘advance’ which a 
moneylender makes to the peasant is an advance of capital in the form of an 
advance of a certain sum of money or of the material elements of circulating 
capital (e.g., seed) and thus bearing the deceptive or illusory appearance 
of a pure ‘loan’. Within a few years, it was this conception that Marx came 
around to accepting. Under this system, he wrote later, ‘the producer pays the 
capitalist his surplus labour in the form of interest’, or the capitalist receives 
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his profi t in the form of interest, so that ‘We have here the whole of capitalist 
production without its advantages…’.166 That is, the labour-process, still being 
a process specifi c to the form of small-scale parcellised peasant-production, 
allowed no scope for a production of relative surplus-value or for the technical 
renovations presupposed therein. It follows also that domination by 
capital in this specifi c form (i.e., by a monied bourgeoisie) would force capital 
outwards in its drive to self-expand, force capital to extend the sphere of its 
domination laterally, to draw into its network an ever-growing mass of peasant- 
households . 
 
This would explain why so many of the peasant-struggles of this period 
(e.g., the Deccan Riots of 1875) were directed against the monied bourgeoisie 
and not against the colonial state, in which sections of the peasantry would 
in fact see a potential benefactor. But, again, because this was likewise a form 
of capitalist production that depended not on the constitution and automatic 
functioning of a labour-market, but on the coercive subjugation of the small  
commodity producer, the later historical empiricism of the Marxist tradition 
would simply isolate and concentrate on these relatively superficial elements 
of coercion and entirely ignore the inner content of the relationships they sustained. 
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